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PREFACE 
Preface 
The start of my studies in economics fell right into the beginning of the subprime mort-
gage crisis – one of the biggest real estate crises in history. Since then, the world has 
changed quickly and so did research in real estate economics. The underlying papers of 
this PhD thesis are intended to offer insight into some of the recent developments in real 
estate markets and to add on to research in real estate economics where many issues still 
remain unsolved. This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support 
of my family, friends and colleagues. 
First, I want to thank my supervisor, Prof. Marcel Thum, who left a deep impression on 
me as early as in my very first lecture in economics. I am grateful for many conversa-
tions, discussions and a good kick when needed. I also want to thank Prof. Georg Hirte, 
who took time and interest to give advice.  
Second, I would like to thank all my PhD colleagues at the Ifo Institute Dresden for 
making this long and difficult journey very special and enjoyable. I especially want to 
thank Prof. Joachim Ragnitz for his support in all these years and his advice on linking 
academic research with the political reality. I have to thank my co-author and friend 
Lars Vandrei. His support from the first day we met at the Ifo Institute for our job 
interviews to this day has been invaluable to me. 
Third, I acknowledge all the helpful comments of participants at conferences in Glas-
gow, Vienna, Delft, Frankfurt am Main, Halle an der Saale, and Dresden among others. 
I am grateful for the hospitality by Prof. Donald Houston (Urban Studies in Glasgow) 
and Prof. Niklas Potrafke (Ifo Institute in Munich) during two research visits.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Housing is a special good as it satisfies several basic human needs. A house is associated 
with shelter, comfort, family, community, but also individuality and self-fulfillment. It 
is a symbol for stability and wealth. Additionally, housing is a prerequisite for participa-
tion in society, e.g., having an address opens the possibility to take part in elections or 
open bank accounts. But housing is of utmost importance for another reason. Buying a 
home is usually the single largest investment of a life-time for most households. For 
example, in 2017, 6.3 times net annual household income was spent on buying a home 
in Germany (vdpResearch 2017).  
Therefore, housing is a field that is subject to particular public attention. Alleged market 
failure is quoted in many election programs as a reason for governmental intervention. 
Governments seek to ensure access to suitable and affordable housing conditions for all 
citizens. Public measures to achieve this goal include rent controls, housing allowance, 
social housing programs and measures to encourage homeownership to name a few.  
Governmental intervention in the housing market should, however, only be necessary 
if there is actual market failure in housing. Imperfect information could be such a market 
failure, which can lead to inefficient allocation of resources. A governmental interven-
tion could be the obligatory disclosure of relevant information for buyers and tenants, 
e.g., regarding energy performance to increase market efficiency. However, governmen-
tal intervention in the housing market is in general a very difficult task because housing 
markets are notoriously complex and frequently affected by new trends (Ahlfeldt and 
Wendland 2017).  
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One trend strongly affecting housing markets is urban concentration. In 1950, the world-
wide share of people living in urban areas was about 30%. This share is projected to 
increase to over 60% by 2050 (United Nations 2014). It is expected that cities will con-
tinue to grow due to the inflow of mainly young people while rural areas are faced with 
depopulation and an aging society. This polarization leads to very divergent challenges 
for the respective housing markets. Urban markets become very tight resulting into in-
creasing prices and very low vacancy rates. In 2015, the average vacancy rate in major 
German cities was only 2% (BBSR 2017) and house prices increased on average by about 
6% (Bulwiengesa AG 2016). Residents with low incomes may have difficulties finding 
suitable housing conditions (e.g., near their work place or schools) and might be forced 
to commute long distances, which challenges urban labor markets and infrastructure 
systems. At the same time, rural areas face structural problems due to the very low de-
mand for housing. This results into low real estate prices and high vacancy rates, which 
may have further negative effects on neighborhood safety. Rural counties in Germany 
recorded an average vacancy rate of about 7% in 2015 (BBSR 2017); the results of the 
German census in 2011 even indicates vacancy rates of over 15% in some municipalities 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2013). Additionally, budgets of local au-
thorities may come under pressure because – for the remaining (mostly elderly) residents 
– the infrastructure might not be decreased to scale and even has to be adjusted while 
revenues decrease. Furthermore, (local) governments raise taxes in order to consolidate 
their budgets, which could potentially affect activity in the housing market negatively.  
In order to assist governments in ensuring efficient housing markets and providing access 
to suitable housing conditions for all people in the face of such divergent challenges, 
research about the functioning of housing markets is needed. My thesis contributes to 
the research on the economic processes that work within housing markets, especially 
with regard to challenges that arise from urban concentration. In particular, it provides 
insight into how differences in vacancy rates and market liquidity arise and into differ-
ences in infrastructure provision. This thesis comprises three essays that represent the 
main chapters. The chapters are related by each connecting housing markets and urban 
policy. Moreover, every chapter focuses on a specific housing and urban policy problem 
that is of particular relevance for Germany. In Germany, regional housing markets differ 
drastically in terms of house prices, homeownership rates, vacancy rates and the quality 
of housing stock (Just and Schäfer 2017), which provides an interesting setting for em-
pirical analysis. The challenges that arise from demographic change and urban concen-
tration are also one of the major concerns for German policy makers. Nevertheless, the 
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conclusions of my thesis are not limited to be applicable to Germany and may be rele-
vant to other countries as well.  
Chapter 2 – the first of the main chapters – addresses possible causes of vacancies in the 
housing market (i.e., unoccupied houses), which is becoming a more and more profound 
challenge for rural areas in the era of continuing urban concentration. Abundant vacan-
cies can be found in regions with very diverse characteristics and are perceived as highly 
problematic. My co-author, Lars Vandrei, and I provide a detailed overview of theoreti-
cal and empirical studies on vacancies. We, first, summarize theoretical approaches, 
which may explain the mechanisms leading to vacancies under the assumptions of the 
standard market model, search and matching theory and behavioral economics. Con-
cerning the latter, we propose a new framework to explain vacancies in the housing 
market in the context of prospect theory. Second, we formulate hypotheses from these 
theories regarding the causes and the extent of vacancies. Then, we evaluate the validity 
of these hypotheses by referring to the existing empirical literature while comparing the 
data, samples and methods employed in the various studies. The main findings of our 
literature review are (1) that there is considerable room to extend existing theoretical 
models and (2) that some hypotheses have either been investigated by the empirical lit-
erature only to a limited degree or have not been investigated at all. We also suggest that 
(3) a social welfare analysis that takes the specific type of vacancy into account is highly 
relevant for housing policy decisions. This chapter is an amended version of a published 
paper (see Fritzsche, C. and L. Vandrei (2014), Keiner will sie haben – Theoretische Ur-
sachen für Immobilienleerstand, Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 47(3): 
465-483). I prepared the description of the search and matching models, formulated the 
respective hypotheses and evaluated their validity with the existing empirical literature 
(Sections 2.2 and 3 in Chapter 2). Lars Vandrei described vacancies under the standard 
market model and proposed a new framework in order to explain vacancies in the hous-
ing market in the context of prospect theory (Sections 2.1 and 2.3 in Chapter 2). To-
gether, we prepared the discussion section. 
Chapter 3 is designed to investigate the effects of real estate transfer taxes, which may 
depress activity in the real estate market. A very low market activity is a challenge for 
both, urban and rural areas, e.g., when people stay in their houses although relocation 
would be more efficient to them (the lock-in effect). Further, it is difficult to find a 
matching house for buyers’ individual needs when market activity is low. Lars Vandrei 
and I use a recent dataset for single-family home purchases to study the effects of the 
German real estate transfer tax on market activity. German states can set their own real 
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estate transfer tax rates. Starting from a common level, almost all German states have 
increased their rates in the past years. We can benefit from regional variation in tax levels 
and tax increases in Germany for our empirical analysis. We estimate the impact of a tax 
change on the timing of real estate transactions (the anticipatory effect) and the impact 
on the overall number of real estate transactions. Our estimates indicate that an increase 
in the transfer tax is negatively correlated with the number of transactions in the market 
for single-family homes. We estimate that a one-percentage-point increase in the transfer 
tax produces significant anticipation effects and yields approximately 6% fewer overall 
transactions in subsequent periods and therefore much lower market activity. This find-
ing points at potential inefficiencies in housing markets – the inefficiency being particu-
larly large in regions with high levels of the transfer taxes. We show that in many cases, 
the former first-best option – to buy or sell a single-family home – is apparently no 
longer the optimal choice for a household. Thus, we expect ownership rates to decrease 
as letting apartments becomes more attractive than selling and renting becomes more 
attractive than buying. Additionally, households are likely to remain in non-ideal hous-
ing as relocation becomes more expensive. This chapter is based on a working paper (see 
Fritzsche, C. and L. Vandrei (2016), The German Real Estate Transfer Tax: Evidence for 
Single-Family Home Transactions, Ifo Working Paper No. 232). I collected the data set 
(media citations, number of transactions, data on public funding instruments and other 
transaction costs). I also prepared the literature review and the institutional background 
and contributed to the conceptualization of the baseline empirical analysis and robust-
ness tests (Sections 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 in Chapter 3). Lars Vandrei conceptualized the theo-
retical background and conducted the econometric estimations (Sections 3, 5 and 6 in 
Chapter 3). 
In the final chapter, I focus on the provision of infrastructure in rural areas. Technical 
infrastructure (especially roads) is closely intertwined with housing markets. When 
houses in urban areas are expensive, an adequate road network allows residents to locate 
further away from agglomeration centers. This takes pressure off housing prices and 
infrastructure system in cities and supports housing markets in rural areas. The general 
population is highly interested in the efficient provision of public goods such as roads 
because, as tax payers, they provide the funds for these public expenditures. I use the 
example of county roads to study whether counties differ in their efficiency of the pro-
vision of infrastructure. I study differences in road provision of local governments in 
Germany using data envelopment analysis. My unique empirical setting allows me to 
take into account differences in the age of the foundation of roads, which – due to data 
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limitations – has not yet been considered by previous studies. Having also collected new 
data on road quality for my analysis, I show that my results differ greatly from existing 
studies when applying proxy data for the quality of roads. I show that the area of the 
road network, the quality of roads and the efficient provision of roads varies a lot across 
German counties. The investigation of factors influencing differences in efficiency, how-
ever, is subject to future research. This chapter is based on a single-authored working 
paper (see Fritzsche, C. (2018), Analyzing the Efficiency of County Road Provision – 
Evidence from Eastern German Counties, Ifo Working Paper No. 249). 
My findings across the three main chapters offer some joint implications for urban pol-
icy. First, even though political decision makers generally aim at providing suitable liv-
ing conditions for their citizens, the results of my studies indicate that different layers of 
government might interfere with each other in reaching this goal. While counties spend 
a significant amount of their budgets on the provision of adequate infrastructure to re-
main attractive for new residents and to stabilize or enhance market activity (Chapter 
4), the state level levies and increases taxes, which discourage market activity and reloca-
tion away from urban areas towards rural areas (Chapter 3). Political measures that at-
tempt to support homeownership creation at the federal level in Germany are another 
example of interference between different layers of government: such expenditures con-
flict with higher real estate transfer taxes (at the state level) that discourage homeowner-
ship. 
Second, a greater matching efficiency could solve some challenges of both, urban and 
rural housing markets. For example, elderly residents in rural areas might desire to relo-
cate to urban areas because of improved proximity to respective services (such as social 
infrastructure) the cities provide. This could lift some pressure off expenditures for the 
adaptation of local infrastructure in rural areas (Chapter 4). However, this process is, 
among other factors, hampered by transaction costs such as transfer taxes as they create 
a lock-in effect (Chapter 3). Prospect theory can be used to explain the reluctance to 
change the housing situation of elderly residents as well. Even though ‘downsizing’ 
would be the better match, owners facing a loss when selling their old dwelling might 
prefer not to relocate (Chapter 2). Next to that, the working population might also be 
negatively affected by transaction costs. Individuals look for closer proximity to their 
working space. With high transfer taxes, they may forgo better job offers in other re-
gions or accept longer commutes, which can have negative consequences on their indi-
vidual utility but also on urban labor markets and infrastructure systems (Chapter 3). 
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Third, governments should be aware of problems related to urban sprawl in smaller 
towns in rural areas. Vacancies in rural areas can often be found in town centers where 
the supply of housing does not match the demand (Chapter 2). At the same time, people 
construct new houses outside of town centers, which perfectly match their needs. This 
process of ‘rural urban sprawl’, however, could increase infrastructure costs as local gov-
ernments have to provide infrastructure for ever more sparsely populated areas (Chapter 
4). The process is further exacerbated by higher real estate transfer taxes: as real estate 
transfer taxes increase, the decision between buying an existing house and building some-
thing new tends to favor construction. No transaction taxes have to be paid in the latter 
case on real estate, as the tax base comprises only land and real estate on that land at the 
moment of purchase (Chapter 3). 
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CHAPTER 2:  CAUSES OF VACANCIES* 
Causes of Vacancies 
We review the existing literature on the causes of vacancies in the housing market. First, we 
present a detailed overview of theoretical approaches that may explain the mechanisms caus-
ing vacancies under the assumptions of a standard market model, the search and matching 
theory and behavioral economics. Concerning the latter, we propose a new framework to ex-
plain vacancies in the housing market in the context of prospect theory. Second, we formulate 
hypotheses based on these theories regarding the causes and the extent of vacancies. Third, we 
evaluate the validity of the hypotheses by referring to the existing empirical literature while 
comparing the data, samples and methods employed in the various studies. The main findings 
of our literature review are (1) that there is considerable room to extend existing theoretical 
models and (2) that some hypotheses have either been investigated by the empirical literature 
only to a limited degree or have not been investigated at all. We also suggest that (3) a social 
welfare analysis that takes the specific type of vacancy into account is highly relevant for hous-
ing policy decisions. 
1. Introduction 
Abundant vacancies are perceived as highly problematic by most housing experts: they 
represent the unused capital of owners, implying a deficient allocation of economic re-
sources. Additionally, vacant dwellings are usually less adequately maintained, leading 
to external effects such as the stigmatism of whole neighborhoods due to vandalism and 
                                                   
* This chapter is an amended version of Vandrei, L. and C. Fritzsche (2014), Keiner will sie haben 
– Theoretische Ursachen für Immobilienleerstand, Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und 
Kapital 47(3): 465-483. 
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crime. Local governments may incur management and demolition costs if a dwelling is 
abandoned (see Silverman et al. 2013 and Molloy 2016). As a consequence, governmental 
policies are instituted to pursue a targeted reduction in vacancies. Before such policies 
are implemented, it is desirable to understand the causal relationships and factors that 
lead to vacancies as not all types of vacancies are considered as problematic (Guasch and 
Marshall 1985 and Silverman et al. 2013). For example, consumers looking for an apart-
ment benefit from having a wider choice of apartments so they find one, which matches 
their needs.1 Additionally, long-term vacancies can be found in regions with very diverse 
characteristics. Thus, policies that are effective for reducing vacancies in one area might 
be less effective in others (Molloy 2016). 
Despite being a very relevant topic in political debates, there has been no systematic 
review of the existing concepts explaining vacancies or the influencing factors. We pro-
vide the first overview of the vacancy literature and identify three different approaches 
that explain the causes of vacancies in the housing market. We start by illustrating the 
emergence of vacancies based on (1) the standard market model followed by a summary 
of (2) the search and matching literature, which is the focus of the main body of the 
literature. Afterwards, we propose a new framework that is based on (3) behavioral as-
sumptions to explain why and under which conditions homeowners are hesitant to sell 
their dwellings, which may lead to vacancies. From these theories, we derive hypotheses 
regarding the causes and the extent of vacancies. Afterwards, we evaluate these hypoth-
eses by comparing them with the results found in the empirical literature. We note dif-
ferences in the empirical analyses regarding the data that is used and the methods that 
are applied. In the last section, we summarize the results and discuss the theoretical ap-
proaches and empirical studies. The main finding of our literature review is that there is 
still considerable room to extend existing theoretical models, especially those based on 
search and matching theory. Furthermore, some hypotheses have either been investi-
gated by the empirical literature only to a limited degree or have not been investigated 
at all. We also suggest that a social welfare analysis that takes the specific type of vacancy 
into account should be considered by future studies. 
                                                   
1 A vacancy rate of close to zero should therefore not be aimed for, as housing markets need a 
certain vacancy rate to reduce market friction, which also occurs in the labor market. 
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2. Theoretical approaches 
Three different models are proposed in the literature to explain the mechanisms leading 
to vacancies in the housing market. In addition to assuming standard perfect market 
conditions, the search and matching theory provides a theoretical framework for supply 
and demand balance in the housing market. Lastly, vacancies can be a symptom of mar-
ket participants acting according to patterns described by behavioral economics. In this 
section, we will analyze each model and formulate hypotheses explaining the emergence 
of vacancies.  
2.1 The standard market model 
Fallis (1984) treats housing as any other good in microeconomics and was the first text-
book to formally describe a full standard market model of housing. In a standard market 
model with full competition, rational actors and symmetric information, demand and 
supply determine the quantity of traded goods and the related price levels. In equilib-
rium, demand and supply are in balance and the market clears. Basic economic theory 
assumes an upward-sloping supply curve. However, it seems reasonable to assume that 
in the short and medium run, the supply in the housing market is fixed: a building would 
have to be demolished to reduce the supply.2 A decrease in demand should therefore 
result in a decrease in the equilibrium price of housing. The number of units on the 
market remains unchanged (Molloy 2016).  
When analyzing vacancies in the context of the standard market model, we are interested 
in scenarios of extremely low prices. In the following, we describe a scenario in which a 
supplier (such as an owner who does not use her dwelling for her own residential pur-
poses or a housing company) is trying to sell a dwelling.3 We assume that the dwelling 
will only be used if it is sold. Otherwise it remains vacant. Although the number of 
housing units that are available on the market is fixed, suppliers are not willing to sell if 
their resulting utility would be lower than when not transacting at all. When there are 
                                                   
2 Considering the durability of housing, Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) suggest that the supply 
curve is vertical at all quantities below the equilibrium price. In line with Fallis (1984), we assume 
that an increase in the quantity supplied takes time because construction processes are rather 
slow; therefore, the supply curve is strictly vertical. 
3 We base our theoretical framework on the basic model outlined by Molloy (2016), which is one 
of very few studies analyzing vacancies under standard perfect market conditions. 
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no maintenance or transaction costs, the minimum price that they would sell for is zero.4 
At this point, suppliers are indifferent to selling or leaving the dwelling vacant. How-
ever, on the one hand, ownership can incur costs such as property taxes and maintenance 
costs. Therefore, homeowners might be willing to even sell for negative prices, or – in 
other words – give someone money to take responsibility for the burden. On the other 
hand, there might be transaction costs linked to selling a dwelling, such as real estate 
transfer taxes, legal fees, notary fees and brokerage fees. These costs result in higher min-
imum prices. The resulting minimum price could be either positive or negative depend-
ing on which of these costs (costs linked to ownership vs. costs linked to transacting) are 
higher for the seller.5 In reality, we commonly observe vacant dwellings with prices 
above zero.  
Figure 1 displays a supply curve 𝑆 with a positive minimum price (𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛). Thus, when 
demand is very low, prices remain at this positive minimum price, which implies that 
the number of occupied dwellings might be below the available stock of dwellings 𝑄. 
For higher prices, the supply curve runs vertically because the housing stock cannot be 
increased in the short run. 
                                                   
4 As a simplification, we assume the transaction and maintenance costs to be equal for everyone. 
However, with heterogeneous costs, owners would have different minimum prices. Thus, the 
supply curve would be sloped upwards. This is commonly assumed in the dynamic equilibrium 
literature (e. g. Anas and Arnott 1991 and Anas and Arnott 1994). Similar to the situation we 
depict here, investors can choose whether to rent or to keep their housing unit vacant. The latter 
is the case, if the market rent is above the investors’ idiosyncratic ‘minimum rent’. 
5 This argument also holds true for a landlord looking for a tenant. It might be plausible to set a 
negative base rent, e.g., to let the tenant maintain the building or pay the property taxes. How-
ever, the act of signing a tenant also results in costs for which the owner wants to be compensated 
for via a positive rent. 
 Causes of Vacancies 
 
 
12 
 
FIGURE 1. ILLUSTRATION OF HOUSING VACANCIES USING THE STANDARD MARKET MODEL 
 
Notes: Own illustration following Molloy (2016). 
Similar to the supply curve, the downward sloping demand curve 𝐷 also has a kink: for 
quantities above the saturation point 𝐵, there is an infinite demand. This point lies below 
a price of zero because a buyer would have to bear both the transaction costs that fall 
upon her in addition to the costs of owning the dwelling. Therefore, she is indifferent 
to conducting a transaction if she would only receive sufficient money to cover these 
expenses (i.e., someone ‘sells’ the dwelling for a negative price). However, if the negative 
price for a dwelling overcompensates these costs, a buyer would make a profit by buying 
dwellings. Thus, for any price below this threshold, there is an infinite demand. For the 
demand curve 𝐷 in Figure 1, there are no vacancies. If demand is very low, as depicted 
in demand curve 𝐷′, the market price 𝑃′ corresponds to the minimum price 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛. In this 
case, the observed number of dwellings on the market is 𝑄´. The difference between 𝑄 
and 𝑄´ is the amount of vacant housing. We therefore state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.1 Vacancies arise only if the market price equals the suppliers’ min-
imum price. 
We can also explain vacancies by relaxing the assumption regarding perfect competition 
in the housing market: for example in the case of a decrease in demand, a monopolistic 
landlord could profit from reducing the number of dwellings she offers on the market 
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and cushion the decrease in market prices. Similarly, with increasing market power, the 
supplier might further reduce the number of units on the market in order to increase 
prices. In the presence of maintenance costs, she would decide to demolish buildings in 
the long run. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the demolition process takes 
some time. Hence, the existence of a monopolistic landlord may lead to vacancies—at 
least in the short run. 
Hypothesis 1.2 As market power increases, the number of vacancies will increase. 
2.2 Search and matching theory 
The search and matching theory – which has been very influential to model labor market 
outcomes such as unemployment – can be applied to housing markets.6 In this frame-
work, imperfect information is introduced to the market. Guasch and Marshall (1985) 
were one of the first to analyze vacancies in an application of search and matching theory 
to the housing market and they were followed by many other scholars. We first describe 
a simplified application of search theory to housing and discuss various extensions of the 
theory later on. The majority of studies we present are concerned with the time a house 
remains on the market before being sold (i.e., not the vacancy rate) and the factors influ-
encing this marketing time. We argue that the time on the market7 influences the time a 
dwelling is vacant. A market’s vacancy rate can be calculated as the average time a (rep-
resentative) dwelling remains on the market divided by the sum of the average time on 
the market and the average time of residence. We use the time on the market in the 
studies as an approximation for the vacancy rate and assume that the time of residence 
is unaffected. 
In the standard search and matching framework, it takes some time for market partici-
pants to conduct a transaction, as they must first find each other (see Stigler 1961). In the 
housing market context, the seller receives various offers for her dwelling and must de-
cide whether she accepts one or not. The seller knows the distribution of the submitted 
                                                   
6 Although Arnott (1987) highlights the fact that the reference to the labor market is unsuitable 
because in the housing market, vacancies are a sign of the excess supply of a commodity, while 
in the labor market, unemployment represents the excess supply of an input. 
7 We assume that all dwellings that are offered for sale are not inhabited. Of course, this is not 
always the case. For example, an owner might already know that she wants to move to a different 
dwelling in half a year, e. g., due to a job transition. Then, she could already put her current house 
up for sale and inhabit it during this time. However, any factor that will prolong her current 
dwelling’s time on the market will also result in a period of vacancy. 
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offers for her dwelling type. For each time period, she estimates whether it is more prof-
itable to wait for higher offers (i.e., to reject in this period and the sampling continues) 
or to accept the current offer. The price at which she is indifferent to wait longer or to 
sell is called her reservation price. It can be profitable for the seller to postpone a sale in 
hopes of a higher offer in the future. Buyers randomly search among the pool of dwell-
ings and have a specific offer price for dwellings of a certain type. If a buyer inspecting 
the unit has an offer price not less than the reservation price of the seller, the dwelling 
becomes occupied; otherwise it remains vacant. 
Buyers face very heterogeneous goods (i.e., types of dwellings with different characteris-
tics) in the housing market. They need to gather information about the properties and 
quality of available dwellings (Guasch and Marshall 1985). This can be a very time con-
suming and therefore, costly process. To identify all the relevant characteristics of a 
dwelling, often, a personal inspection is necessary (Haurin 1988). As a result, a dwelling 
remains vacant while potential buyers gather the information needed to make a purchase 
decision. In the case of dwellings with very diverse characteristics (not only regarding 
the number of bathrooms, balconies, and pools but also with very unique features such 
as extravagant tiles), there are fewer market participants for every ‘dwelling category’, 
leading to a long search and matching process and a very illiquid market. In the housing 
literature, the term ‘heterogeneity’ is used to describe such differences in characteristics 
among dwellings (see for example Guasch and Marshall 1985, Haurin 1988, Sass 1988 and 
Forgey et al. 1996).  
Hypothesis 1.3 The more heterogeneous the dwellings are, the more vacancies. 
The basic search and matching framework can be extended by considering different fac-
tors that influence the matching process. One such factor is the introduction of uncer-
tainty about the submitted offers and a Bayesian learning process.8 In this case, the seller 
sets the initial list price relatively high (Horowitz 1992). If no match occurs, she learns 
something about the distribution of offers and adjusts the list price downwards (Lazear 
1986, Herrin et al. 2004). High list prices above the market value could lead to a much 
lower demand for a specific dwelling (e.g., if buyers only look at a specific price range). 
This implies that it would remain vacant for a longer period of time. 
                                                   
8 In the standard framework, sellers know about the distribution of offers and there is only un-
certainty about which offers are drawn from the distribution. 
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Hypothesis 1.4 The higher the list prices are compared to the market value, the 
more vacancies. 
The motivation of buyers and sellers to search and wait is influenced by the costs they 
face during this process. For example, Miceli (1989) describes a framework in which 
sellers seek to optimize between the sales price (for which they might have to wait 
longer) and the amount of time the dwelling remains on the market. Buyers have to 
optimize between a lower price (for which they might have to look longer) and a fast 
transaction. Depending on the costs to hold a dwelling, these factors (price vs. time) are 
weighted differently. If the costs to hold a dwelling are very low, the matching process 
is prolonged and dwellings remain vacant for a longer period of time. 
Hypothesis 1.5 The lower the costs to hold a dwelling, the more vacancies. 
Vacancies are influenced not only by the overall heterogeneity of dwellings but also by 
the presence of certain dwelling types. Guasch and Marshall (1985) propose a framework 
in which small units usually attract more transient residents and thus have a higher prob-
ability of tenants leaving the unit.9 Owners (i.e., landlords), however, prefer long-term 
tenants because frequent changes in tenants are associated with higher (search) costs. As 
a result, the authors assume that owners set a higher rent per unit space compared to 
large units.10 Therefore, not only should the time of residence be lower but also the 
marketing time for small dwelling should be higher. As a result, market segments with 
a high share of small units should exhibit higher vacancy rates than comparable markets 
with bigger units. 
Hypothesis 1.6 For the overall rental market, the higher the share of small dwell-
ings, the more vacancies. 
There are also factors that can decrease the number of vacancies: more intermediaries 
                                                   
9 In their framework, the authors assume that household size is an increasing function of the age 
of the household head and that older residents move less frequently than younger households 
with one or two members. This assumption is based on data from the Bureau of the Census of 
the United States. 
10 This is a strict assumption because it can also be argued that there are more offers in a housing 
market for transient residents (as transient residents search more frequently) and therefore search 
costs for owners are lower. 
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(such as real estate brokers) can reduce the time a dwelling remains on the market (see 
Yavaş 1992, Mantrala and Zabel 1995 and Forgey et al. 1996). These intermediaries might 
reduce the information asymmetries of market participants (e.g., they assist potential 
buyers during their search), which could accelerate the matching process between 
agents.11 
Hypothesis 1.7 The more intermediaries there are, the fewer vacancies. 
Read (1988) introduces lags between search processes of landlords and tenants as another 
extension to the standard search model. In the author’s model, a tenant starts her search 
process before informing her current landlord about her intention to move. Subse-
quently, the landlord can only start her search process at the time at which her dwelling 
falls vacant. However, tenancy laws differ between regions. This form of vacancy can be 
avoided if a sufficiently long period of notice is mandatory. 
Hypothesis 1.8 The longer the mandatory period of notice, the fewer vacancies. 
2.3 Behavioral economics 
There are very few studies that incorporate patterns described by behavioral economics 
in the context of housing markets. In contrast to previously discussed approaches, be-
havioral economics considers psychological factors that might influence the decision-
making processes of market participants. These factors may explain some of the behav-
ioral patterns that do not seem to be rational according to the standard incentive para-
digm.  
For this theoretical approach to housing vacancies, loss aversion and the related prospect 
theory need to be explained (see Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). Compared to other 
behavioral economics approaches12, prospect theory considers the disposition effect13, 
                                                   
11 An analysis of Read (1988) follows a similar logic. The author points out that landlords’ adver-
tising intensity reduces the vacancy duration. Hiring a real estate broker can be considered a 
special case of advertising. 
12 In this context, ‘mental accounting’ should be mentioned (see Thaler 1985): this behavior de-
scribes the aversion of an investor to incur a loss and having to admit she struck a bad deal. 
Similarly, the sunk-cost effect can explain the risky behavior of a seller if she suffered a loss: costs 
that were previously incurred are included in the present decision-making process (see Arkes and 
Blumer 1985). 
13 This term was introduced by Shefrin and Statman (1985). 
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which is also observed on the stock market. This effect describes the behavior of keeping 
assets with a value below the initial purchase price longer than assets for which the price 
has increased.  
Based on experimental studies, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) construct a utility func-
tion that does not depend on the absolute (e.g., monetary) value of the good but on 
changes relative to a reference point. The authors find that test subjects become more 
risk seeking if they must make a decision after suffering a loss. However, they exhibit 
risk aversion when facing potential gains. The authors derive an S-shaped function for 
the relative values of utility. Moreover, they observe that losses (relative to the reference 
point) have a greater impact on utility than gains of an equal size. As a result, the utility 
function exhibits a kink at the reference point. It is steeper in the range of losses than in 
the range of gains. For an agent to enter a lottery that results in a loss or a gain relative 
to the reference point, the expected value must be significantly positive.  
Prospect theory was applied to the housing market by Genesove and Mayer (2001) and 
later by Anenberg (2011). Bokhari and Geltner (2011) applied prospect theory to the com-
mercial real estate market. Genesove and Mayer (2001) argue that a seller asks for a higher 
price for the dwelling if the expected sales price is below the initial purchase price. Based 
on this consideration, they analyze the amount of time that a dwelling stays on the mar-
ket in a search and matching context. If the seller demands a higher price than the market 
value, it takes longer until an offer is submitted because the buyer must be willing to pay 
the higher price. The same argument holds for the broader context of loss aversion, 
which has gained attention in subsequent studies (Engelhardt 2003 and Einiö et al. 2008). 
From our point of view, prospect theory can be used to explain more than the vacancies 
in a search and matching context. The theoretical model underlying prospect theory can 
also be used to describe how the price setting mechanism is influenced by a certain ref-
erence point and why the owner might be reluctant to sell (which eventually leads to a 
vacancy). In the context of this model, vacancies can arise even for homogeneous dwell-
ings, agents with homogeneous preferences and symmetric information. In the follow-
ing, we provide a conceptual framework to explain this mechanism. Our proposed 
framework, however, is not a complete theoretical model. 
An agent A decided in period 0 to build a house for the cost of 𝑐. In period 1, she leaves 
and wants to sell her property. She can now either sell it to agent B or keep the house 
for another period. According to exogenous circumstances, B offers either a high (𝑝𝐻) or 
a low price (𝑝𝐿) with 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑐 < 𝑝𝐻. The resulting net gains from a potential sell would 
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be 𝑦𝐿 = 𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐 < 0 and 𝑦𝐻 = 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑐 > 0, respectively. If agent A does not sell her prop-
erty in period 1, she is offered a new price in period 2, which is, again, either lower or 
higher than the price in period 1 (see Figure 2). If agent A decides to keep the house in 
period 1, it is vacant for that period. If it is sold, agent B inhabits it for that period. As 
our simple model is limited to two periods, in period 2, either agent is going to sell her 
property (if she is an owner). The price in period 2 is exogenous. For simplicity, an 
agent’s utility depends only on cash flows associated with purchasing or selling the 
house. 
FIGURE 2. DECISION TREE FOR AGENT A 
 
Notes: Own illustration. Squares denote decisions, circles denote fifty-percent chances for the exogenous price evolution. 
Agents A and B exhibit a utility function in accordance with the findings of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). The function is S-shaped with a kink. Figure 3 depicts the utility 
function of agent A and its set of options in period 1. The utility function is formed such 
that the agent becomes more risk seeking after suffering a loss (point L; convex) com-
pared to facing a gain (point H; concave) and losses are valued higher than gains (the 
utility function is steeper in the loss area than in the gain area). 
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FIGURE 3. ILLUSTRATION OF UTILITY FUNCTION OF AGENT A 
 
Notes: Own illustration following Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
It is now possible to assess whether agent A is going to sell to agent B in period 1 or 
whether she is going to participate in the ‘lottery’ of price changes in period 2. We can 
do so by comparing the value of the lottery for both agents by looking at the agents’ 
certainty equivalents. The certainty equivalent refers to the guaranteed return that yields 
the same utility for an agent as a risky return from a lottery. Thus, the certainty equiv-
alent measures the subjective value of the lottery depending on the risk attitude of the 
agent. For a transaction to occur, agent B needs to value the lottery higher than agent A. 
Agent A’s value of the lottery, however, depends on her risk attitude, which, in turn, 
depends on the past price development, i.e., whether a sale in period 1 would be associ-
ated with net gains 𝑦𝐻 or net losses 𝑦𝐿. 
The difference between the two agents is that agent B has no history, thus starts in point 
0, while agent A has incurred costs of 𝑐 before and is now offered a price of 𝑝𝐿 or 𝑝𝐻, 
thus starts in either point L or H. Hence, in period 1, agent B would consider her invest-
ment as the reference point. She bases her decision on the possible future price develop-
ment, whereas the past development is irrelevant to her. Due to the steeper slope in the 
utility function for potential losses than for gains, she is risk-averse regarding a possible 
investment. Her certainty equivalent is therefore below the expected price in the next 
period.  
For agent A, however, the value of the certainty equivalent depends on past price devel-
opments. If agent A is faced with a loss (point L), she becomes risk seeking. Her certainty 
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equivalent is positive. Thus, in period 1, she will only accept offers that are well above 
the expected price of the forthcoming period. Otherwise, agent A keeps the house, leaves 
it vacant and enters the lottery in period 2. Since agent B’s offers are below the expected 
price in period 2 (due to her negative certainty equivalent), they are also below agent A’s 
certainty equivalent. Agent A considers the lottery more valuable than the offered price 
and thus, no transaction occurs. The house remains vacant in period 1.  
If agent A is faced with a gain (point H), however, the result is less obvious. Agent A is, 
facing a potential gain, risk-averse as is agent B. Therefore, agent A’s certainty equivalent 
in this scenario is also lower than the expected price in the following period. However, 
the shape of the utility function suggests that it is not lower than the certainty equivalent 
of agent B.14 While in the base model there is still no sale, the certainty equivalents of 
both parties are a lot closer than in the loss scenario. A transaction therefore becomes 
more probable when adding other factors to the model, such as operating or mainte-
nance costs. Agent A needs to set these costs off against her certainty equivalent for the 
lottery. As the costs increase, she becomes more willing to accept an offer. A second 
expansion would be the potential utility agent B obtains from inhabiting the house. The 
higher agent B’s utility is, the greater her willingness to pay. Therefore, there will be a 
certain share of sellers and buyers that are able to generate transaction profits. This share 
will be greater for a positive demand shock with subsequent high prices in period 1 and 
lower for a negative one with lower prices in period 1.  
Hypothesis 1.9 Negative (positive) demand shocks increase (reduce) the number 
of vacancies. 
We highlight the fact that even if buyers and sellers are homogenous individuals, their 
willingness to pay differs depending on market developments. Given a positive or a neg-
ative demand shock on the market, the chance that a transaction will occur either in-
creases or decreases, respectively. 
The model can even be extended to include market provision of new houses. If agent A 
did not buy the dwelling in the past but rather faces the decision to build a new dwelling 
in period 0, it can be shown that her decision depends on the expectations of pricing in 
period 1. Agent A needs to assign a sufficiently large probability to receiving 𝑦𝐻 over 𝑦𝐿 
                                                   
14 Both the kink at the reference point and the concave slope in the gains range of the utility 
function result in risk aversion. For reasonable parameters for the function, the effect of the kink 
outweighs the effect of the concave slope (see Hens and Vlcek 2011). 
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to extend market supply. As a result, houses are constructed only if a sufficiently positive 
development in the housing market is expected. 
3. Empirical findings 
In the following, we assess the formulated hypotheses based on the empirical results 
published in the literature. We also highlight differences in the data, samples and meth-
ods employed in the various studies. 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.1: Vacancies arise only if the market price equals the sup-
pliers’ minimum price. 
As we illustrated in Section 2.1, vacancies could reflect that demand equals supply. In 
that case, we expect house prices to reflect suppliers’ minimum prices. However, there 
are no studies quantifying suppliers’ minimum prices, let alone linking minimum prices 
to vacancies. 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.2: As market power increases, the number of vacancies 
will increase. 
There is no prior empirical case to review, and to our knowledge, there is no literature 
regarding the monopolistic power of housing companies. The housing industry is usu-
ally quite competitive. Therefore, only very large real estate companies might have some 
market power and could potentially influence both prices and the number of vacancies.15  
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.3: The more heterogeneous the dwellings are, the more 
vacancies. 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.4: The higher the list prices are compared to the market 
value, the more vacancies. 
Thinner (and therefore less liquid) submarkets lead to more vacancies, as fewer people 
demand the different dwellings and it takes longer for buyers to gather all the relevant 
                                                   
15 However, the housing stock of even very large suppliers is relatively small compared to the 
total market supply. 
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information. Thin submarkets can emerge due to heterogeneity16 of dwellings (Hypoth-
esis 1.3) and due to high list prices (Hypothesis 1.4). The empirical literature sometimes 
studies the two separately, but there is also some research on the effects of thin markets 
in general. 
Haurin (1988) uses data on a suburb in Columbus (Ohio) for 1976 and 1977 and finds 
empirical support for Hypothesis 1.3 using a survival-failure time model:17 dwellings 
with individual characteristics (that form individual submarkets) stay on the market 
longer.18 The author concludes that heterogeneity caused by unusual features extends the 
search process and therefore increases the number of vacancies. Carrillo and Pope (2012) 
apply a decomposition method to data on transactions in the Washington D.C. metro-
politan area between 1997 and 2007. The authors assess how much of the shift of the 
time distribution for marketing dwellings can be explained by changes in the unique 
attributes of the dwellings.19 They find that different dwelling types are marketed for 
different lengths of time: apartments have a longer marketing time than single-family 
homes.20 Additionally, the authors find that the market time varies greatly across re-
gions. 
Yavaş and Yang (1995) construct a regression model using a two-stage least squares ap-
proach21 and show that because of list prices well above the market value of the dwellings 
(Hypothesis 1.4), the housing market becomes thinner and matching becomes less likely, 
which eventually results in an increase in the number of vacant dwellings. Their sample 
includes data on the State College Area School District in Pennsylvania in 1991. How-
ever, the authors only find empirical evidence for dwellings in the medium price range. 
The authors cannot identify the same relationship for dwellings with relatively high or 
                                                   
16 The term ‘heterogeneity’ is used in the literature to describe the differences between character-
istics of dwellings; see also Section 2.2. 
17 These models are usually used to analyze factors that influence the time it takes for a specific 
event to occur. Regarding vacancies, Haurin (1988) measures the time a dwelling remains on the 
market from its initial listing until it is sold. 
18 This result regarding Columbus has been reconfirmed with updated data (1997-2005) (see Hau-
rin et al. 2010). 
19 This method allows to simulate the distribution of time on the market for each year in the 
study period assuming that the dwellings had the same characteristics as in 2003. 
20 This finding does not necessarily confirm the hypothesis as it could be argued that the market 
for single-family homes (which might have more individual characteristics) is thinner than the 
market for apartments (which might be relatively standardized). 
21 Similar to Sass (1988), this method is used to overcome the endogeneity problem between sales 
prices and the time on the market. Yavaş and Yang (1995) use the time on the market as the 
dependent variable. Therefore, they develop an instrument for the sales price, in a first step. 
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low market prices. Forgey et al. (1996) apply the same estimation method22 to data on 
single-family home transactions in Texas between 1991 and 1993. The authors conclude 
that higher prices decrease the frequency of submitted offers and higher-priced dwellings 
remain unoccupied for a longer period of time. Guren (2014) also proposes a framework 
where list prices above the market value induce a longer marketing time and thus more 
vacancies. However, he assumes that reducing the list price below the market value only 
slightly decreases the marketing time. He uses data on listings in Los Angeles and San 
Diego metropolitan areas from 2008 to 2013 and applies an instrumental variable ap-
proach (using the aggregate price appreciation that considers the amount the seller orig-
inally paid for the dwelling and the relative list price). The author finds a statistically 
significant concave relationship between marketing time and the list price relative to the 
(quality-adjusted) average local house price. Khezr (2015) applies the two-stage least 
squares approach to data on the housing market in Sydney, Australia, in 2011 and finds 
a positive correlation between the list price and the time a dwelling remains vacant. De 
Wit and van der Klaauw (2013) conduct an empirical study using data from the Nether-
lands between 2005 and 2007. By applying survival analysis, they find that there is con-
siderable uncertainty by sellers regarding the market value and that list price reductions 
increase the chance of selling a dwelling, which reduces the number of vacancies. Han 
and Strange (2016) provide evidence that higher list prices lead to fewer visits and there-
fore longer marketing periods. They use data on North American metropolitan areas 
from 2006 to 2009 and consider the number of bidders on each dwelling. They find that 
a lower list price encourages more buyers to visit but only up to a certain point. After 
that point, bidding wars emerge, and no additional buyers can be attracted by an even 
lower list price. 
Herrin et al. (2004) examine data regarding single-family homes in California and show 
that sellers in a thin market take longer to reduce their list prices and therefore face 
longer marketing periods. However, there are findings in the literature that indicate po-
tentially shorter marketing times in thin markets: Sass (1988) uses data regarding King 
County (Washington) from 1977 for a two-stage least squares approach23 and observes 
                                                   
22 Forgey et al. (1996) solve the same endogeneity problem as Sass (1988) and Yavaş and Yang 
(1995). First, they develop an instrument for the time on the market. For the second step, they 
regress the sales price and other variables, such as the quality of the dwelling, seasonal effects, the 
labor market situation, intermediaries and the capital market, on this instrument. 
23 In this model, the difference between the list price and the sales price is regressed on a number 
of factors. In the first step, an instrument needs to be constructed for the variable measuring the 
 Causes of Vacancies 
 
 
24 
 
that sellers in a thin market tend to have shorter marketing times than sellers that operate 
in a more liquid market. The author explains his findings with the information an offer 
gives about the sample and the respective learning process: thin markets lead to fewer 
offers (the ‘population-size-effect’) while at the same time the sellers obtain more infor-
mation from each offer and therefore adjust their initial list prices faster (the ‘price-cut-
ting-effect’). In his sample, the author finds the latter effect on the marketing period to 
be greater than the former and observes shorter marketing periods for dwellings in thin 
markets. The findings are somewhat confirmed by Yavaş and Yang (1995) who cannot 
find evidence for a positive correlation between list prices and marketing time for dwell-
ings in the very high and very low price ranges. Anenberg (2016) also studies sellers’ 
learning processes about the distribution of offers for their dwelling but finds quite the 
opposite effect. The author uses data on single-family home listings in California from 
2007 to 2009 and uses a simulated method of moments24 to show that sellers in thin 
markets usually face a longer marketing period and thus more vacancies. 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.5: The lower the costs to hold a dwelling, the more vacan-
cies. 
Low costs for holding a dwelling could decrease the motivation of buyers and sellers to 
transact quickly and therefore increase the vacancy rate. There are a few studies which 
investigate the effects of holding costs: Glower et al. (1998) explore differences in seller 
holding costs using data from Columbus (Ohio) between 1990 and 1991. Using a sur-
vival/failure time model and an OLS estimation, they observe differences in the motiva-
tion of sellers: if sellers do not want to sell quickly (i.e., if they have low holding costs), 
they have a higher reservation price and only accept high offers, which results in more 
vacancies because matching becomes less likely. Holding costs are also studied by Har-
ding et al. (2003) using data obtained from the American Housing Survey (waves from 
1985 to 1993). The authors apply a censored regression model25 and identify certain char-
acteristics of the sellers (such as gender, income or the number of children) that signifi-
cantly influence holding costs. For example, families with school-age children have very 
                                                   
days a dwelling spends on the market because differences in prices also influence the number of 
days a dwelling spends on the market. 
24 This estimation method is an extension of the generalized method of moments in which mo-
ments are computed from simulated data that are estimated by the economic model, which are 
then matched with actual data.  
25 Those models are used if the variable of interest is only available under certain circumstances. 
The American Housing Survey only encodes data starting with the 97th percentile. Thus, the 
coding point for very expensive properties varies between waves. 
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high holding costs if they do not sell during the summer break because they might have 
to wait another (school) year before they can try to sell again. Harding et al. (2003) find 
that families with school-age children conduct a transaction much faster during summer 
than families without children. Thus, high costs to hold a dwelling could lead to less 
vacancies. 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.6: For the overall rental market, the higher the share of 
small dwellings, the more vacancies. 
Under the assumption that landlords of small dwellings ask for higher rents per unit 
space, those dwellings should remain vacant for a longer period of time. The study by 
Guasch and Marshall (1985) is the only one in the literature that empirically investigates 
this hypothesis. They use data on rental units in Philadelphia from 1974 to 1977 and 
confirm the hypothesis. The authors perform an OLS regression of various characteris-
tics on the duration of vacancy in months. They find a positive and significant correla-
tion between the number of units in a structure (where primarily small dwellings can be 
found in Philadelphia) and the duration of vacancy. In addition, they find a negative and 
insignificant correlation between the number of rooms in a dwelling and the duration 
of vacancy. However, Guasch and Marshall (1985) note that their results are not conclu-
sive because the sample includes a very small number of observations. Additionally, the 
authors are not able to control for regional characteristics (such as differences in the 
neighborhoods) due to data limitations. 
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Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.7: The more intermediaries there are, the fewer vacancies. 
Intermediaries could decrease information asymmetries of market participants and there-
fore fewer vacancies should be observed. Forgey et al. (1996) analyze the influence of real 
estate brokers: they observe a decrease in the marketing time, implying that housing 
markets where fewer intermediaries are involved are more likely to be affected by va-
cancies. By contrast, Rutherford and Yavaş̧ (2012) show that dwellings listed by a dis-
count brokerage firm (additionally to non-discount brokers) take longer to sell. In that 
case, more intermediaries could also increase the number of vacancies. The authors use 
data on metropolitan areas in Texas for dwellings that were sold between 2002 and 
2004.26 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.8: The longer the mandatory period of notice, the fewer 
vacancies. 
Because a landlord can only start her search process when informed about her former 
tenant’s intentions to move, vacancies arise. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
empirical study that connects the vacancy rate to the length of the period of notice for 
terminating a rental contract. Suitable empirical settings could be found, for example, in 
Germany where there have been some rental reforms in the past which affected the man-
datory period of notice (e.g., Gesetz zur Änderung des Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerli-
chen Gesetzbuche, 17/03/2005). 
Empirical findings for Hypothesis 1.9: Negative (positive) demand shocks increase (reduce) the 
number of vacancies. 
There is no empirical work that examines the direct link between demand shocks and 
vacancies. However, a strand of literature finds that falling (rising) prices in the housing 
market induce market activity to decrease (increase) and thus the marketing time in-
creases (decreases), which is an implication of our hypotheses. The results in the litera-
ture therefore do not reject the hypothesis. Genesove and Mayer (2001) conduct an OLS 
                                                   
26 Rutherford and Yavaş (2012) use a hazard model to avoid the problem of wasting valuable 
information that occurs when using ordinary least squares for non-linear relationships. The au-
thors also control for self-selection of a discount listing and find that discount agents obtain prices 
similar to other agents in comparable residential markets. 
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estimation using data on transactions in the 1990s in Boston. They find that the transac-
tion volume is positively correlated with market prices because sellers who face a loss set 
higher list prices compared to those facing a gain. Therefore, a negative demand shock 
reducing market prices would lead to fewer transactions. Furthermore, the authors apply 
a Cox regression27 to estimate the influence of impending losses on the time a dwelling 
remains on the market. Genesove and Mayer (2001) find that sellers facing a prospective 
loss also face an increase in marketing time. The hypothesis is also supported by subse-
quent studies that observe similar results: Engelhardt (2003) studies US metropolitan 
areas; Einiö et al. (2008) studies Helsinki; Anenberg (2011) 28 studies the San Francisco 
Bay Area; and Bokhari and Geltner (2011) study commercial real estate in the US. 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
In this section, we summarize the theoretical and empirical results and discuss further 
extensions and unsolved issues (see Table 1). 
                                                   
27 Cox regressions (see Cox 1972) are one type of survival/failure time models (see above).  
28 Anenberg (2011) also finds evidence that owners tend to set higher prices after a market down-
turn due to equity constraints. However, if an owner is faced with equity constraints, she will 
not leave her current dwelling. Thus, this strand of literature is not related to vacancies and there-
fore is not included in our study. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Hypothesis Empirical Findings Comments 
The standard market model 
1.1 No empirical studies quantifying suppliers’ minimum prices Assumptions of the model may create un-
verifiable relations 
1.2 No empirical studies on the monopolistic power of housing 
companies 
Monopolistic power difficult to observe or 
non-existent; potential for future empirical 
analysis 
Search and matching theory 
1.3 Confirmed by Haurin (1988), Herrin et al. (2004), Haurin et 
al. (2010) and Anenberg (2016); countervailing effects observed 
by Sass (1988) 
Detailed examination of empirical differ-
ences between housing markets is needed 
1.4 Confirmed by Forgey et al. (1996), Guren (2014), Khezr (2015), 
de Wit and van der Klaauw (2013), Han and Strange (2016); 
countervailing effects for thin markets observed by Sass (1988) 
and Yavaş and Yang (1995) 
Detailed examination of empirical differ-
ences between housing markets is needed 
1.5 Confirmed by Glower et al. (1998) and Harding et al. (2003) Hypothesis confirmed 
1.6 Confirmed by Guasch and Marshall (1985) Results limited due to the small number of 
observations; potential for future empirical 
analysis 
1.7 Confirmed by Forgey et al. (1996) ); countervailing effects for 
discount brokerage firms observed by Rutherford and Yavas ̧
(2012) 
Countervailing effects not theoretically 
studied 
1.8 No empirical studies on the mandatory period of notice Potential for future empirical analysis 
Behavioral economics 
1.9 Indirectly confirmed by Genesove and Mayer (2001), Engel-
hardt (2003), Einiö et al. (2008), Anenberg (2011) and Bokhari 
and Geltner (2011) 
No direct effect on vacancies is measured 
Notes: The table summarizes the empirical findings discussed above and includes our own remarks and comments pub-
lished in the literature regarding possible extensions and unsolved issues. 
4.1 Discussion of the theoretical approaches 
There is considerable room to extend existing theoretical models. On the one hand, there 
are aspects of the housing market which could influence the vacancy rate that have not 
been incorporated in existing models. For example, the search and matching literature 
regarding real estate markets neglects the possibility of new arrivals on the local housing 
market, e.g., via immigration (which has already been applied for the labor market; see 
Rogerson et al. 2005). These agents usually possess less information than local residents 
(for example, regarding prices or the average time on the market) and therefore face 
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higher search costs.29 Additional frictions in the housing market could also be introduced 
due to taxes (such as the real estate transfer tax and property taxes), which, in turn, can 
influence vacancy rates as shown in Section 2. The effects of taxes in the housing market 
context have not been studied in the theoretical literature. This type of study could pro-
vide valuable information regarding policy strategies intending to reduce vacancies. 
On the other hand, some of the empirical studies falsify the existing theories. Thus, there 
is a need for new theoretical frameworks that could explain the contradicting findings. 
A detailed theoretical investigation of certain characteristics of market participants (in-
cluding differences between intermediaries, such as discount vs. traditional brokerage 
firms), would enhance the current literature. Next to that, some studies find a positive 
correlation between high list prices compared to the market value and the time on the 
market, especially in thin markets (e.g., Forgey et al. 1996, Guren 2014 and Khezr 2015), 
whereas others find the opposite relationship (Sass 1988 and Yavaş and Yang 1995). A 
theoretical exploration of the contradicting findings could be a valuable addition to the 
literature. 
4.2 Discussion of the empirical findings 
Some hypotheses have either been investigated by the empirical literature only to a lim-
ited degree or have not been investigated at all. The influence of monopolistic power on 
the vacancy rate has not been studied until now, which is either because monopolistic 
power in housing markets is difficult to observe or does not exist. A suitable setting 
could potentially be found in thin submarkets that target specific groups of buyers. Mo-
nopolistic power could also exist in cities with a large housing association that owns the 
majority of prefabricated high-rise buildings in specific districts (where they form a large 
share of the housing supply). Concerning search and matching theory, the empirical 
investigations of the influence of a certain dwelling type (such as small dwellings) are 
quite limited. 
As already mentioned, the results of some empirical studies are not consistent with those 
of others (e.g., regarding the influence of high list prices and intermediaries). These coun-
tervailing results may be due to differences in environmental conditions of the respective 
                                                   
29 Higher search costs could imply more vacancies (as a dwelling remains vacant while potential 
buyers gather the information needed to make a purchase decision). However, it is also possible 
that new arrivals have higher holding costs than local residents (e.g., due to longer commutes as 
long as they cannot find a dwelling) which could result in fewer vacancies. 
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housing markets as different data sets are compared. There might be omitted variables, 
whose impact on the housing market still needs to be identified in future empirical re-
search. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this literature review, we summarize existing theoretical and empirical studies regard-
ing the causes of vacancies in the housing market. The main findings of our literature 
review are (1) that there is considerable room to extend existing theoretical models and 
(2) that some hypotheses have either been investigated by the empirical literature only 
to a limited degree or have not been investigated at all. We also suggest that (3) a social 
welfare analysis that takes the specific type of vacancy into account is highly relevant for 
housing policy decisions. Therefore, next to the positive analysis of the mechanisms that 
cause vacancies, we need to pose the normative question, if and under which circum-
stances vacancies should be considered problematic.  
Vacancies in the short run may be a necessity in a search and matching context to offer 
potential buyers a heterogeneous pool of options to choose from and to fit their individ-
ual needs. An artificial reduction in those prices (e.g., due to binding price ceilings) may 
be effective at reducing vacancies. However, it would also increase the probability that 
a dwelling is purchased by a buyer with a lower willingness to pay compared to a poten-
tial buyer in a future period. Additionally, with the assumptions of behavioral econom-
ics, an owner of a vacant dwelling might find greater pleasure in speculating with the 
object than a buyer would enjoy living in it. Hence, vacancies do not necessarily reflect 
a welfare loss. However, vacancies could indicate a welfare loss if caused by a monopolist 
that artificially reduces (and yet does not demolishes) the housing supply on a market. 
In the context of search and matching, a reduction in information asymmetry could 
reduce vacancies and increase welfare. For example, obligating landlords to disclose an 
energy performance certificate might reduce buyers’ search costs and duration and there-
fore vacancies. Equivalently, a mandatory period of notice for terminating a rental con-
tract might enable landlords to start the search process sooner and thus reduce the va-
cancy duration. Another important factor influencing vacancies is costs to hold a dwell-
ing. However, an increase in these costs, which raises the motivation for buyers and 
sellers to transact quickly, e.g., via higher property taxes, could be problematic. As with 
any market regulation, they must be placed in the context of potential economic distor-
tions regarding the efficient market outcome. It always takes some time for market par-
ticipants to find each other so the burden of such unavoidable short-term vacancies 
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should not be too high. Furthermore, to leave a dwelling vacant might be efficient for 
the owners depending on their individual utility function (e.g., if they intend to hold the 
dwelling for future usage). As long as taxes such as the property tax cover all external 
costs associated with the vacancy, leaving the dwelling vacant might be an efficient mar-
ket outcome. 
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Rutherford, R. and A. Yavaş (2012), Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Mar-
kets, Real Estate Economics 40(3): 508-535. 
Sass, T. R. (1988), A note on optimal price cutting behavior under demand uncertainty, 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 70: 336-339. 
Shefrin, H. and M. Statman (1985), The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride 
Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, The Journal of Finance 40(3): 777-790. 
 Causes of Vacancies 
 
 
34 
 
Silverman, R. M., Yin, L. and K. L. Patterson (2013), Dawn of the Dead City: An Ex-
planatory Analysis of Vacant Addresses in Buffalo, NY, 2008-2010, Journal of Urban 
Affairs 35(2): 131-152. 
Stigler, G. J. (1961), The Economics of Information, The Journal of Political Economy 
69(3): 213-225. 
Thaler, R. (1985), Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, Marketing Science 4(3): 199-
214. 
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CHAPTER 3:  EFFECTS OF REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAXES* 
Effects of Real Estate Transfer Taxes 
This chapter uses recent data for single-family home purchases to study the effects of the Ger-
man real estate transfer tax on market activity. We aim to estimate the impact of a tax change 
on the timing of real estate transactions and the impact on the overall number of real estate 
transactions. Our estimates indicate that an increase in the transfer tax is negatively corre-
lated with the number of transactions in the market for single-family homes. We estimate that 
a one-percentage-point increase in the transfer tax produces significant anticipation effects and 
yields approximately 6% fewer overall transactions and therefore much lower market activ-
ity. 
1. Introduction 
The impact of real estate transfer taxes30 on the residential housing market is a contro-
versial subject in both political debates and scholarly research. On the one hand, some 
authors consider the positive effects of transfer taxes that result from less speculation in 
the real estate market (see Catte et al. 2004). However, these findings are empirically 
ambiguous (see Fu et al. 2013 and Aregger et al. 2013). They must also be placed in the 
context of potentially larger economic distortions because, on the other hand, several 
                                                   
* This chapter is a slightly amended version of Fritzsche, C. and L. Vandrei (2016), The German 
Real Estate Transfer Tax: Evidence for Single-Family Home Transactions, Ifo Working Paper No. 
232. The paper is currently under revise and resubmit in the journal Regional Science and Urban 
Economics. 
30 The literature uses several different terms for real estate transfer taxes, e.g., land transfer taxes, 
property transfer taxes, housing transfer taxes, or real property transfer taxes. To simplify, we 
refer to all of those as real estate transfer taxes. 
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adverse effects might accompany real estate transfer taxes: lower labor mobility, mis-
matched housing situations (for example, retired households might be discouraged from 
downsizing, leading to misallocation of the housing stock; see Glaeser and Luttmer 2003) 
or an inefficient shift from owner occupancy towards rental housing. In this chapter, we 
show that the anticipation of a transfer tax increase leads to massive distortions regarding 
the transaction date (the anticipation effect). Moreover, higher taxes reduce overall mar-
ket activity to a lower level (the lock-in effect).31 This proves a necessary condition for 
any of the above-mentioned adverse economic distortions to be present. We exploit a 
new dataset on real estate transfer tax increases at different times in different states in 
Germany. We conduct a two-way fixed effects regression using a full survey of actual 
single-family home transactions and quantify the effects of a change in the tax rate on 
the number of transactions, which reflect the market reactions. 
Despite its economic relevance, there is only a small body of literature that focuses on 
the effects of real estate transfer taxes on the housing market.32 One of the first studies 
addressing the effects of an increase – of approximately 1.5 percentage points – in the 
transfer tax was undertaken by Benjamin et al. (1993) and involved sales of land in Phil-
adelphia. The authors find that the sales prices of properties within Philadelphia de-
creased by 8% relative to properties outside of the metropolitan area as a result of higher 
tax rates.33 In a more recent study, the impact of Toronto’s transfer tax, which was im-
posed on single-family home sales in early 2008, has been studied by Dachis et al. (2012). 
As the real estate market did not anticipate the tax change, the authors only study lock-
in effects and estimate that the 1.1% tax increase led to a substantial decline in transac-
tions (14%) and to a 1% decline in prices. Davidhoff and Leigh (2013) analyze the price 
                                                   
31 Following Slemrod et al. (2017), we refer to the overall reduction in market activity as the lock-
in effect although a reduction in the number of transactions may not only be due to households 
actually being ‘locked-in’ (i.e., not moving). Another possibility could be that households decide 
to rent their dwelling out instead of selling. 
32 The effects of higher transaction costs in general (including those due to higher real estate trans-
fer taxes) are a recurring theme in the literature. For example, van Ommeren and van Leu-
vensteijn (2005) examine the effects of transaction costs on residential mobility in the Nether-
lands. However, it is useful to focus on one type of transaction cost, as we do here. In summariz-
ing transaction costs, empirical examinations are hampered because different costs are often paid 
at different points in time and fall upon different market participants. Further, the definition of 
a transaction cost varies greatly in previous studies, which further muddles the results, particu-
larly in terms of comparisons. To distinguish our study from this strand of the literature, we 
discuss only those studies that directly measure the effects of a change in the real estate transfer 
tax in this section. 
33 The authors explain these strong market reaction with imperfections in the American mortgage 
market. 
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effects of an increase in the transfer tax in Australia. Using annual data on aggregate 
house sales between 1993 and 2005, they find that an increase in the transfer tax of one 
percentage point leads to a drop in house prices of approximately 8%. The authors also 
study housing turnover and find that a 10% increase in the tax rate decreases the number 
of transactions by 6%. Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) examine the effects on house prices 
of a 1% real estate transfer tax on residential transactions valued at over $1 million (the 
price notch) in New York and New Jersey. Empirically, the authors find evidence of 
significant bunching just below this price notch. Similarly, Slemrod et al. (2017) analyze 
different policy reforms around real estate transfer taxes in Washington, D.C. They find 
evidence of manipulative sorting around the price notch but not around the time notch 
(i.e., the date of the tax change). Compared to previous studies, the authors examine a 
rather small tax change, which could explain the limited response. With regard to Euro-
pean real estate transfer taxes, there are studies considering the effects of transfer taxes 
in the U.K. Best and Kleven (2017) study the impact of a tax holiday between 2008 and 
2009 and show that there is bunching just below the price notches34 in addition to dis-
tortions involving the volume and timing of transactions. These results indicate that a 
one-percentage-point increase in the transfer tax leads to a 12% decrease in transactions. 
The same unanticipated stamp duty tax holiday was studied by Besley et al. (2014), who 
find that it led to significant decreases in sales prices and increases in transactions (+8%). 
In the case of Germany, Petkova and Weichenrieder (2017) use annual indices of prop-
erty transactions and average prices to study the effects on prices and on the number of 
transactions for single-family homes and apartments separately.35 They find significant 
tax effects on the number of transactions only for single-family homes (a change in the 
tax rate from 4% to 5% reduces the number of transactions by approximately 6%).  
Our analysis, however, differs from previous studies. First, we are one of very few stud-
ies to quantify both anticipatory and lock-in effects due to changes in the tax rate. We 
include dummy variables before and after the tax increase to capture when transactions 
are pushed ahead of the tax increase. By controlling for this bunching around the tax 
increase, we can measure the lock-in effect of the tax increase. Second, due to the unique 
institutional setting, with Germany’s flat tax rate and, therefore, no price notch, we are 
able to perfectly isolate the time notch effect, as no manipulation around the price notch 
                                                   
34 In the U.K., the real estate transfer tax is a progressive tax rate with several notches. 
35 Considering the data constraints in Germany, using these data is a valuable addition in explor-
ing the effects of transfer taxes. However, the annual indices are not based on complete micro 
data and are not consistent across states or over time. As tax changes sometimes take place during 
a year, monthly data allow for more accurate results than annual data do. 
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needs to be accounted for. Third, we contribute to the quite limited empirical literature 
on non-Anglo-Saxon areas. We believe that markets behave differently depending on the 
role of information and friction. In continental European housing markets, bank lending 
practices are more conservative, homeownership and residential mobility rates are 
lower, housing supply tends to be more rigid and tenant-landlord regulations are com-
paratively strict (Andrews et al. 2011). Fourth, our micro data on single-family home 
transactions provide a powerful basis for assessing the adverse effects of real estate trans-
fer taxes in various German states over the 2005–2015 period. The results of our study 
indicate that a transfer tax increase is negatively correlated with the number of transac-
tions that occur in the market for single-family homes. We find significant evidence that 
transfer tax increases lead to massive bunching of transactions just before an increase and 
to an equally large drop in transactions immediately following a tax increase. In addition, 
after a tax increase, market activity decreases permanently by 6% due to the lock-in ef-
fect.  
2. Institutional background 
To highlight the economic relevance of real estate transfer taxes and to provide support 
for our empirical strategy, we present relevant institutional background facts on real 
estate transfer taxes.  
Real estate transfer taxes are commonplace and an important source of government rev-
enues in many OECD countries (Andrews et al. 2011).36 Nonetheless, there is significant 
variation in tax rates across countries; for example, at 10%, Belgium imposes one of the 
highest tax rates on real estate transactions in Europe (although some exceptions apply; 
European Commission 2015). In some countries, such as the U.K. and Portugal, progres-
sive rate structures are utilized. Notably, almost half of EU member states have transfer 
tax rates below 5%, and Germany currently fits right in the middle with a median rate 
across all German states of 5%. As a consequence, the share of real estate transfer taxes 
                                                   
36 In 2012, tax revenues from real estate transfer taxes equaled 0.8% of GDP in the European 
Union (European Commission 2015). 
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of total transaction costs37 varies substantially among countries (see Figure 4). With re-
gard to Germany, the real estate transfer tax amounted to nearly 52% of the average 
transaction cost in 2011.38 
FIGURE 4. AVERAGE SHARE OF REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAXES OF TRANSACTION COSTS FOR 
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES, 2011 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average share of real estate transfer taxes of the total transaction costs for property transactions 
in 2011 for OECD countries for which data are available. Transaction costs include notary and legal fees, real estate agent 
(broker’s) fees and real estate transfer taxes. Data: Andrews et al. (2011). 
In general, real estate transfer tax regimes differ greatly among countries with regard to 
the tax base, tax schedule, exemptions and tax incidence (for a comparison of the taxation 
of housing transfers in different countries, see Table 9 in the appendix). Although most 
countries apply progressive tax rates, German states impose basically flat tax rates on 
real estate transactions. Therefore, there is no price notch for real estate transactions in 
Germany, which provides us with a very unique setting for our empirical analysis. Fur-
ther, there are only a few exemptions from taxation in Germany: notably, transactions 
                                                   
37 Following Andrews et al. (2011), transaction costs include notary and legal fees, real estate agent 
(broker’s) fees and real estate transfer taxes. 
38 For more details on transaction costs in Germany, see Figure 12 and the explanations in the 
appendix. 
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valued at less than €2,500, inheritances and transfers within families are exempt from the 
transfer tax.  
After the buyer and seller agree upon a price, a notary must draft the contract for the 
purchase of the property. After executing the contract, the attesting notary requests reg-
istration in the land register. Then, the tax office assesses a real estate transfer tax on the 
buyer, the party formally responsible for paying the tax. 
The German real estate transfer tax system has been subject to substantial revisions: in 
1983, the tax rate was standardized at 2% for all German states.39 This rate was raised to 
3.5% in 1997. However, following a 2006 constitutional reform of the German Federa-
tion, German states can set their own real estate transfer tax rates (similar to US states40), 
and almost all German states (with the exception of Bavaria and Saxony) have increased 
their rates since that time. In particular, rightwing governments were less active in in-
creasing the real estate transfer tax rates than leftwing and center governments (Krause 
and Potrafke 2016). Figure 5 provides an overview of the effective dates of each increase.  
                                                   
39 The German states constitute the second layer of government beneath the federal level. 
40 Contrary to the US case, only German states and no other authority (such as city governments) 
can alter the tax rate. 
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FIGURE 5. REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX RATES IN GERMAN STATES FROM 2006 TO 2016 
 
Notes: The figure presents real estate transfer tax rates of the German states from January 2006 to December 2016. The 
first six states are included in our empirical analysis. Changes in the tax rate typically take place at the beginning of a 
month, although the first increase in Saxony-Anhalt took place on the 2nd of March in 2010. Data: Official announcements 
from German state governments. 
To date, no German state has decreased the real estate transfer tax rate, and tax rates 
range between 3.5% and 6.5%, resulting in an increase in the average tax rate across all 
German states since 2007 of approximately 51%. 
Real estate transfer taxes are an important source of revenue for state governments. As 
public debt levels are quite high in many German states, tax increases are typically justi-
fied by the consolidation of budgets (see Table 10 in the appendix). Furthermore, the 
‘debt brake’ anchored in Germany’s constitution will become effective in 2020, impos-
ing strict borrowing limits and requiring structurally balanced budgets for all state gov-
ernments. This fundamental reform, passed in 2009, created further incentives for state 
governments to increase their real estate transfer tax rates to generate revenues. Tax 
changes primarily come into effect in January – presumably for practical reasons and not 
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because real estate transactions are particularly high in this month.41 Therefore, it is as-
sumed that the calendar month in which a change in the tax rate occurs is independent 
of the number of real estate transactions that typically occur in that month. 
Although the tax rates do not seem to be particularly high, the real estate transfer tax 
results in a relatively high tax amount to be paid because of the substantial taxable base 
(i.e., the value of property). For example, high property values in Hamburg lead to a 
significant amount in the tax amount to be paid (although the tax rate itself is not above 
average in that state). Figure 6 shows the average transfer tax paid per transaction and 
the respective tax rates in 2012 for each German state. Therefore, even small changes in 
the tax rate may cause buyers to accelerate a planned transaction to pay a lower tax.  
FIGURE 6. AVERAGE REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX PAID PER TRANSACTION AND THE 
RESPECTIVE TAX RATES, 2012 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average real estate transfer tax paid per transaction (black bars) and the respective tax rate 
(gray bars) in Germany in 2012. Data: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2015), Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raum-
forschung (2015), Official announcements by German state governments and Arbeitskreis der Gutachterausschüsse und 
Oberen Gutachterausschüsse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2014). 
                                                   
41 In fact, our analysis shows that the number of single-family home transactions is relatively low 
in January (see Section 4). 
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Changes to real estate transfer tax rates are typically announced several months in ad-
vance, as they must be passed by state parliaments. Figure 7 charts media coverage on 
the topic and the respective tax increases for the states included in our empirical analy-
sis.42  
  
                                                   
42 We obtained the data from Genios, Germany’s largest business information and research tool, 
which provides access to several hundred million documents. We cannot distinguish among 
degrees of perception in the documents and therefore included all international, national and 
regional newspapers, journals and magazines available in the database: The Financial Times, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Handelsblatt, Die 
Welt, Die Welt am Sonntag, Die Zeit, Süddeutsche, Spiegel Online, Wirtschaftswoche, Focus, 
Focus-Money, Immobilien Zeitung, Immobilienwirtschaft, dapd Nachrichtenagentur, news ak-
tuell, vdi Nachrichten, Börse Online, Euro am Sonntag, die tageszeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, Ber-
liner Morgenpost, Berliner Zeitung, Berliner Kurier, Frankfurter Rundschau, Westfalen-Blatt, 
Rhein-Zeitung, General-Anzeiger, Sonntag Aktuell, Münchner Abendzeitung, Stuttgarter Zei-
tung, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Kölner Stadtanzeiger, Kölnische Rundschau, Nürnberger Nach-
richten, Saarbrücker Zeitung, Meininger Tageblatt, Aachener Nachrichten, Märkische Allge-
meine, Schweriner Volkszeitung, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, Potsdamer Neuste Nachrichten, 
Leipziger Volkszeitung, Lampertheimer Zeitung, and Darmstädter Echo. 
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FIGURE 7. MEDIA CITATIONS OF REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX INCREASES IN GERMAN STATES 
IN OUR SAMPLE  
  
  
  
Notes: The figure provides the media citations of ‘Grunderwerbsteuer Erhöhung’ (real estate transfer tax increases) plus the 
respective state name. Media coverage has been particularly intense at the end of the legal year, as many newspapers 
present special issues that cover major tax changes in the upcoming year. If there have been simultaneous tax increases in 
different states, media coverage has generally been higher. Media speculation on further tax increases can be observed 
after elections, in particular. Data: http://www.genios.de. 
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Media citations are particularly high when tax changes are announced or discussed by 
the state parliaments. At the actual date of the tax increase, media coverage is less active. 
The data indicate that the timing of the tax changes in most cases is largely anticipated.43 
In the next section, we illustrate a theoretical framework to investigate this anticipation 
effect. 
3. Conceptual framework 
In this section, we refer to the theoretical framework proposed by Slemrod et al. (2017) 
to distinguish between the various economic effects of increases of the real estate transfer 
tax. Slemrod et al. (2017) address both a price and a time discontinuity (or notch) for 
when new taxes take effect. As there is no price notch in Germany, we limit our analysis 
to the time notch. We will describe a simplification of the model used in Slemrod et al. 
(2017, p. 142). We do not account for the bargaining power of the transacting parties, as 
this is irrelevant to the questions of whether and when a transaction occurs. To demon-
strate the mechanics of the model, we use graphical illustrations of our own design. 
Potential buyers and sellers in the housing market are matched exogenously. Both the 
buyer’s and the seller’s valuation of a house are determined by exogenous outside op-
tions. Both parties have preferences regarding the transaction date. Moving the transac-
tion away from the preferred sale or buy date reduces the utility of either party based 
on convex cost functions. Thus, utility is a combination of the transaction price and the 
transaction date. The preferred transaction date yields the highest utility for a given 
price. Figure 8 depicts the price/date combinations (indifference curves) for both seller 
and buyer that yield the lowest acceptable utility levels in a scenario without transfer 
taxes. The seller would gain higher utility from higher prices at a given transaction date. 
Thus, higher indifference curves represent higher utility levels for the seller, whereas 
lower indifference curves represent higher utility levels for the buyer. 
                                                   
43 The only exceptions here are Saarland and Saxony-Anhalt, where media coverage has been 
relatively sparse. In Saarland, a stepwise increase in the real estate transfer tax on a yearly basis 
was announced in 2009, which might explain this pattern. 
 Effects of Real Estate Transfer Taxes 
 
46 
 
FIGURE 8. ILLUSTRATION OF BARGAINING SOLUTION IN A SCENARIO WITHOUT TAXES 
 
Notes: The figure depicts the bargaining solution of a matched buyer and seller pair. 𝑡𝑠 (𝑡𝑏) is the seller’s (buyer’s) preferred 
transaction date. The indifference curves, 𝑈𝑠 and 𝑈𝑏, show the seller’s reservation price and the buyer’s willingness to pay 
as functions of the transaction date. The distance [AB] depicts the highest possible bargaining surplus. Thus, the transac-
tion will take place in 𝑡𝑎. 𝑝𝑎 , and 𝑝𝑎 represent the lower and upper bounds on the transaction price. Source: Own illus-
tration following Slemrod et al. (2017). 
Buyers and sellers engage in a Nash bargaining situation well in advance of the actual 
transaction, and the transaction date is uniquely defined by the Pareto-optimality condi-
tion. In the interior solution, the indifference curves are tangent, thus maximizing the 
bargaining surplus. Subsequently, the price is determined based on the individual bar-
gaining power of both parties. 
Figure 9 illustrates the introduction of real estate transfer taxes. The red line indicates 
the date on which the new tax takes effect. Since the transaction tax is imposed on the 
buyer, his indifference curve is split into a net and a gross willingness to pay. The dotted 
line, 𝑈𝑏̅̅̅̅ , marks the highest gross price that the buyer is willing to pay for given transac-
tion dates. Consequently, the buyer’s net willingness to pay is lowered by the amount 
of the appropriate tax liability. 
Because the tax is assessed on the basis of the sales price, with a lower price, the buyer 
profits not only from paying less to the seller but also from having to pay a lower tax 
amount. Therefore, the party can reduce the transaction price while moving the trans-
action slightly towards the seller’s preference (from 𝑡𝑎 to 𝑡𝑎
𝜏) and thereby increase the 
transaction surplus. The same argumentation holds for postponing the transaction if the 
buyer prefers to transact earlier than the seller does. 
However, if the time period between the effective date of the new tax and the bargaining 
solution with taxes is sufficiently short, the amount of taxes saved compensates for the 
rather strong deviation in the time preferences ([𝐸𝐹] compared to [𝐶𝐷]). As a result, 
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transactions become bunched just before the effective date of the new tax (the notch), 
which is followed by a steep drop in transaction numbers for a period after the notch 
(the anticipation effect). 
FIGURE 9. ILLUSTRATION OF BARGAINING SOLUTION IN A SCENARIO WITH A NEW TAX – 
ANTICIPATION EFFECT WITH RESPECT TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
 
Notes: The new real estate transfer tax rate is introduced at 𝑡𝜏. Here, the buyer’s indifference curve shows a discontinuity. 
Because he must pay a higher price after the effective date of the new tax rate, his net willingness to pay drops on that 
date. The bargaining surplus absent taxes ([𝐴𝐵]) can no longer be obtained. The highest possible outcome with the new 
tax in place is located at 𝑡𝑎
𝜏 with a bargaining surplus of [𝐶𝐷].44 However, in the depicted scenario, buyer and seller will 
choose to transact marginally before the effective date of the new tax. In 𝑡𝑎
𝜏2, they achieve a bargaining surplus of [𝐸𝐹] >
[𝐶𝐷]. Source: Own illustration following Slemrod et al. (2017). 
A second effect is that transactions might not take place at all due to transfer taxes, which 
is the case if the bargaining surplus in a situation without taxes is smaller than the tax 
liability at all times. The reason for this effect is either that the price spread in the will-
ingness to pay and the reservation price is fairly small, the transaction date preferences 
are wide apart (see Figure 10), or a combination of the two. If so, a transfer tax might 
lead to a negative maximal bargaining surplus. Thus, in such a case, not transacting at all 
results in the highest utility for both parties (the lock-in effect).  
                                                   
44 More precisely, [𝐶𝐷] represents the bargaining surplus if the seller holds all the bargaining 
power. If the buyer holds all the bargaining power, the surplus would be (1 + 𝜏)[𝐶𝐷] because of 
the lower tax liability. 
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FIGURE 10. ILLUSTRATION OF BARGAINING SOLUTION IN A SCENARIO WITH A NEW TAX – 
THE LOCK-IN EFFECT 
 
Notes: The figure depicts a scenario in which no transaction takes place due to the real estate transfer tax. The buyer’s 
willingness to pay does not exceed the seller’s reservation price at any given time. Thus, no surplus can be generated by 
transacting. Source: Own illustration following Slemrod et al. (2017). 
For an announced but not yet implemented transfer tax increase, we expect temporal 
substitutions. To maximize the bargaining surplus, accelerating transactions is profitable 
if the tax saved compensates for the utility loss resulting from the time deviation. All 
transactions that would have taken place sufficiently close after the tax increase are 
moved to a transaction date marginally before the tax increase. 
Hypothesis 1: More transactions take place just before the tax increase (bunch-
ing). 
On the other hand, those transactions that are brought forward do not take place after 
implementation of the higher real estate transfer tax. 
Hypothesis 2: Fewer transactions take place immediately after the tax increase 
(lagging). 
With real estate transfer taxes in place, the sale of a property yields less utility as lower 
prices can be obtained. Concurrently, buying a property also yields less utility as higher 
prices must be paid. Therefore, the number of transactions should drop after the tax 
increase. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the real estate transfer tax, the fewer transactions take 
place (lock-in). 
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4. Data 
In the following sections, we empirically investigate the conceptual framework described 
above. Figures on real estate transactions in Germany are scarce. Other studies on the 
effects of real estate transfer taxes have relied on data aggregated at the federal level and 
on an annual basis, which are quite crude and empirically unfounded (see RWI 2012), or 
on annual indices that are not consistent across states or over time (see Petkova and 
Weichenrieder 2017). Fortunately, we can rely on a new micro dataset provided by the 
Property Valuation Committees of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate, 
Saarland and Saxony-Anhalt. Property Valuation Committees are official institutions 
that receive copies of each sales contract that is finalized in their administrative region. 
The data we use for our analysis are therefore based on a complete survey.  
In our empirical investigation, we only include transactions involving single-family 
homes for several reasons.45 First, these dwellings have a high rate of owner-occupation 
and are used for private housing (see Table 8 in the appendix); therefore, our sample 
consists almost exclusively of private transactions. Commercial transactions might bias 
our results, as commercial buyers can set the real estate transfer tax off against the tax 
liability.46 Of all transactions that take place, single-family home transactions form the 
majority (see Table 12 in the appendix). The data cover the number of single-family home 
transactions since 2005 on a monthly basis for each of the six German states in the sam-
ple.  
Our sample spans the period from January 2005 to December 201447 for almost all states 
in the sample, which allows us to include all tax increases that took effect during the 
sample period.48 We included two years prior to the constitutional reform allowing states 
                                                   
45 For more details on the market share and average price of single-family homes in the states 
included in the sample, see Table 11 in the appendix. 
46 More specifically, landlords are eligible for a tax deduction because ‘expenses from letting or 
leasing’ include the real estate transfer tax. When the property is used for commercial purposes, 
‘operating expenses’ include the real estate transfer tax. Next to that, when a company that owns 
real estate is acquired, under certain circumstances no real estate transfer tax is levied (Fischer and 
Best 2016). 
47 As a result, our time frame includes the recent global financial and economic crisis. However, 
it is reasonable to assume that the crisis does not skew our results, as the German real-estate 
market was mostly unaffected by the crisis because interest rates for real estate financing are tra-
ditionally fixed for long periods of time in Germany and the average equity component is higher 
than in other countries (BMVBS 2012). 
48 The only exception is Saarland, for which data were available only between 2010 and 2013; 
therefore, the latest real estate transfer tax increase is not included. For Berlin, Rhineland-Palati-
nate and Saxony-Anhalt, data were even available after 2014. 
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to set their own tax rates. By examining transactions in which no tax increases could 
have taken place, we can control for seasonal and common factors that might affect 
transactions on a range of relatively similar properties.  
The sample is restricted to transactions that are considered normal by the Property Val-
uation Committees, i.e., transactions of unusually low or high size and price for each 
region are not included.49 As a result, the impact of outliers is minimized. Overall, 12 tax 
increases are covered by our sample (see Figure 5). Altogether, these restrictions produce 
a sample size of 665 observations, which are summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS PER MONTH FOR DIFFERENT 
GERMAN STATES, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX RATE AND THE SIZE OF THE TAX INCREASE 
Variable Time Frame Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Number of Transactions per Month 01/2005-08/2015 317 185 20 1,157 665 
… in Berlin 01/2005-08/2015 255 73 85 711 128 
… in Brandenburg 01/2005-12/2014 480 112 168 1,128 120 
… in Bremen 01/2005-12/2014 98 33 20 214 120 
… in Rhineland-Palatinate 01/2005-03/2015 545 157 120 1,157 123 
… in Saarland 01/2010-12/2013 210 48 99 329 48 
… in Saxony-Anhalt 01/2005-06/2015 253 56 84 417 126 
Real Estate Transfer Tax Rate 01/2005-08/2015 4.17 0.74 3.50 6.00 665 
Size of the Tax Increase 01/2007-01/2014 0.875 0.361 0.5 1.5 12 
Notes: The table reports the descriptive statistics of the dataset. The data provided by Rhineland-Palatinate do not cover 
transactions in the cities of Kaiserslautern, Koblenz, Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Mainz, Trier and Worms. 
Certain interesting features emerge from the descriptive statistics: the number of trans-
actions per month varies greatly among states. We have months in which we observe as 
few as 20 sales in one state and months with more than 1,000 transactions. All of our 
selected states increased their real estate transfer tax rates during the considered time 
frame – at different times and by different margins. Altogether, the sample contains 12 
tax increases, and the average real estate transfer tax is approximately 4.2%. Figure 11 
plots the number of transactions per month for each included German state over time.  
  
                                                   
49 Concerning the elimination of outliers, we need to rely on the expertise of the Property Valu-
ation Committees. Property Valuation Committees have existed in Germany since 1960, and 
their main tasks include market observation and valuation. Data from the Property Valuation 
Committees play a fundamental role in tax valuation of real estates and, thus, uniform guidelines 
in the data preparation process are applied across all German states. We are therefore very confi-
dent that the sample restriction is suitable for our analysis. 
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FIGURE 11. TRANSACTIONS IN GERMAN STATES IN OUR SAMPLE  
  
  
  
Notes: The figure presents the number of transactions for each German state included in the sample over time. Data: 
Property Valuation Committees in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Saxony-Anhalt. 
Figure 11 suggests that some transactions have been accelerated and rescheduled to take 
place just before the tax increases. There clearly seems to be a bunching around the dates 
of tax increases. Apart from bunching at the tax increase notches, we notice bunching 
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on an even larger scale at the end of 2005. This observation can be explained by the 
abolition of a large public funding instrument, the ‘Eigenheimzulage’.50 Compared to the 
bunching effects around the tax increases, a decrease in overall real estate market activity 
is somewhat obvious in Figure 11 for Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. However, over-
all, the strong bunching effects and the high degree of seasonality make it difficult to 
identify a level shift in the number of transactions after tax increases. In the following 
econometric analysis, we isolate this lock-in effect. 
5. Estimating the effects of a tax increase 
5.1 Empirical strategy 
All German states began with the same real estate transfer tax levels at the outset of our 
observed time frame. State governments have been authorized to independently set their 
own tax rates since September 2006. Whenever a state changes its tax rate, the remaining 
states function as control groups. In our sample, many states have raised their tax rates 
by different amounts and at different times. To measure causal effects, we need to rule 
out reverse causality of tax increases and transaction numbers. Specifically, tax increases 
must not depend on the number of transactions in the same period. This threat is miti-
gated by the fact that there is a temporal gap of several months between the decision and 
the implementation of a tax increase. Governments could, however, schedule tax raises 
based on an expected increase in transactions. The data show that this is not the case: tax 
increases are mostly introduced in January, when market activity is comparably low. 
Rather than being concerned with the housing market, state governments base tax 
                                                   
50 The ‘Eigenheimzulage’ funding instrument was one of the largest public funding instruments in 
Germany. It was introduced in 1996 to support the acquisition of owner-occupied residential 
property for low-income households (Heitel et al. 2011). The financial burden for the federal 
budget associated with the ‘Eigenheimzulage’ was relatively high while the number of new homes 
completed was not as high as expected (Dorffmeister et al. 2011). As a result, the federal govern-
ment considered abolishing the funding instrument, which led to massive anticipation effects for 
three years until the ‘Eigenheimzulage’ was actually abolished in January 2006 (Dorffmeister et al. 
2011). 
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changes upon the consolidation of budgets (see Section 2).51 However, there might be 
interdependencies between states: when one state increases its transfer tax rate, house-
holds might choose not to move to this state but might instead migrate to another state. 
We are not able to control for this particular increase in transactions in that other state. 
However, there are only a few urban areas of different states that are sufficiently close 
to be considered geographical substitutes for migration decisions.52 Moreover, state-spe-
cific characteristics (e.g., administrative divisions, educational systems or availability of 
nurseries) might be more important to migration decisions than transfer taxes.53 Alto-
gether, we are provided with a setting that is suitable for identifying the causal effects of 
real estate transfer taxes on the number of transactions. 
Our regression design is a two-way least squares dummy variable estimation. The fixed 
effects panel regression is important to control for state-specific characteristics in our 
panel. We control for time-varying specifics affecting all states by including a date 
dummy for every month in our sample. This allows us to separate changes in transaction 
numbers that are based on adjusted real estate transfer taxes from those that stem from 
an underlying trend affecting all states at the same time. The baseline estimation takes 
the following form: 
                                                   
51 With no suitable instrument at hand, we cannot directly test for strict exogeneity. However, 
we strongly suppose that strict exogeneity is not violated in our model: to illustrate, we estimate 
a logistic regression model of the probability of a tax increase in all 16 German states between 
2005 and 2017 (see Table 13 in the appendix). While the debt level is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 0.1 level, the transaction volume is not. This strongly suggests that 
changes in the tax rate are not influenced by the number of transactions. Further, single-family 
homes are typically inhabited for very long periods. As a result, buyers might associate higher 
taxes with an increase in public services and therefore be more willing to buy.  
52 This issue might be particularly relevant for so-called twin metropolitan areas, such as Mann-
heim and Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Ulm and Neu-Ulm and Mainz and Wiesbaden. Twin metro-
politan areas are not included in our sample.  
53 However, we conduct a robustness check in which we omit observations that might be influ-
enced by border effects (see Section 6.3). 
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𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾ℎ𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑖,𝑡
2
ℎ=1
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑗=1
 
+ ∑ 𝜂𝑘(𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑘=1
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑘,𝑖,𝑡) + ∑ 𝜃𝑙(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑙=1
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙,𝑖,𝑡) 
 
+ 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  . 
𝑇𝑖,𝑡 denotes the log number of transactions in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as the dependent variable. 
On the right-hand side, we include the level of the real estate transfer tax rate, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡. Fur-
thermore, we add dummy variables for 2 months before a particular state tax changes, 
𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑖,𝑡, and for 2 months after the tax changes, 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑖,𝑡. We further multiply these 
dummies by the level of the corresponding tax increase in percentage points 
(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙,𝑖,𝑡) and report the results. In this manner, we can test 
whether the anticipation effect depends on the extent of the increase. To control for any 
effects that affect all states simultaneously, we include dummy variables, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡, for each 
month of our panel. The equation comprises group-specific constants 𝛼𝑖 and the error 
term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. For our results to be robust against heteroscedasticity, we employ Huber-
White sandwich standard errors (see Huber 1967, White 1980).  
Of course, there are other factors besides real estate transfer taxes that influence the 
quantity of single-family home transactions. On the one hand, the overall transaction 
costs include fees for the notary as well as for the real estate agent (see Figure 12 and the 
corresponding explanations in the appendix). On the other hand, we expect changes in 
financing conditions, such as the interest rate or funding programs (see Table 14 in the 
appendix), to influence the decision to transact. Fortunately, the most influential changes 
in these conditions apply to all states concurrently: a notary fee change in August 2013; 
the abolishment of the funding instrument ‘Eigenheimzulage’ in January 2006; and the 
introduction of the funding instrument ‘Eigenheimrente’ in January 2008. There are a 
few state-level funding programs that might influence our observations. However, the 
budgets of those programs are often at a negligible scale.54 We have no reason to believe 
that any other variables systematically distort the number of transactions. In conclusion, 
we expect the estimated relationship between the real estate transfer tax and the number 
of transactions to be of a causal nature. 
                                                   
54 We conduct a robustness check for these state-level funding instruments in Section 6.5. 
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5.2 Results 
Table 3 reports the regression output. In line with the primary stream of the previous 
literature, we find a significant negative correlation of the number of single-family home 
transactions and the level of the real estate transfer tax in all specifications. An increase 
in the transfer tax of one percentage point results in approximately 6% fewer transac-
tions because of the lock-in effect (specification (1) and (2), see below). This is sizeable, 
considering that the average tax increase in our dataset is 0.875 percentage points, which 
translates to approximately 5% fewer transactions. Of course, the measured effects refer 
to marginal changes from the average tax rate. However, a one-percentage-point increase 
in a tax always translates to the same financial burden (e.g., €1,500 for a dwelling that is 
priced at €150,000). This is true for a tax increase from one to two percentage points as 
well as one from five to six percentage points. This financial burden supposedly exhibits 
the same impact on the transaction decision for both mentioned increases. For that rea-
son, we take a cautious look at changes of larger magnitude: Brandenburg increased their 
real estate transfer tax from 3.5% (in 2006) to 6.5% in 2015. Our results suggest that 
Brandenburg thereby reduced transactions by roughly 17.5%. 
On top of the lock-in effects, we observe massive anticipation effects for the months just 
before and just after a tax is increased. This bunching around the time notch was not 
observed by Slemrod et al. (2017). The empirical setting of Slemrod et al. (2017) included 
a price notch, which could explain this difference from our results: instead of moving a 
transaction to a date marginally before the tax increase, market participations could set 
prices just below the price notch (i.e., time preferences seem to be relatively more inflex-
ible than price preferences). As there is no price notch in Germany, this strategy is not 
possible; therefore, only temporal substitutions can be observed. The first regression (1) 
suggests that the anticipation effect depends on the level of the tax increase. Aggregating 
the coefficients of the interaction terms with the plain anticipation coefficients results in 
approximately 43% more transactions just before the time notch for a tax rate increase 
of one percentage point. Consistently, the results aggregate to a drop of 44% fewer trans-
actions immediately following an increase. We observe similar results in the second spec-
ification (2) in which we omit the anticipation dummy variables.  
In column (3), we use anticipation dummies but do not account for the level of tax in-
creases. Here, we measure the pure anticipation dummies without controlling for the 
size of the tax increases. The coefficients thus represent the anticipation effects for an 
average tax increase, which is 0.875 percentage points. If the size of the tax increase does 
play a role, then the coefficients would be underestimated for the interpretation of a one-
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percentage-point increase. The higher real estate transfer tax coefficient suggests that this 
is actually the case. Accordingly, we find slightly lower coefficients – of approximately 
41% more transactions and 42% fewer transactions – on either side of the time notch.55 
In Column (4), we omit all anticipation effects and find a stronger effect of the transfer 
tax level. This is not surprising when we compare the time frames with the lowest and 
the highest transfer taxes in any state: the time frame with the lowest transfer tax is right 
at the beginning and shows a bunching of transactions at its end due to an approaching 
tax increase. There is no corresponding drop in transactions measured during this time. 
The time frame with the highest tax, however, starts off with a precipitous drop in trans-
actions immediately after a tax increase without bunching for possible future tax in-
creases. We measure approximately 13% fewer transactions for a one-percentage-point 
increase in the transfer tax. When we control for bunching effects, however, 6% fewer 
transactions remain as the lock-in effect. 
                                                   
55 We discuss the slightly asymmetric findings for the anticipation periods in Section 6.1, where 
we allow for anticipation periods of different lengths. 
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TABLE 3. BASELINE RESULTS 
 Dependent Variable: Log Number of Single-Family Home Transactions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real Estate Transfer Tax Rate -0.0581** -0.0589**  -0.0690** -0.1274*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0256) (0.0266)  
2 Months Before Tax Change     
Dummy -0.0379  -0.0160  
 (0.2062)  (0.0701)  
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 0.0282 -0.0071   
 (0.1705) (0.0625)   
1 Month Before Tax Change     
Dummy 0.0887  0.4076***  
 (0.1822)  (0.0858)  
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 0.3403* 0.4216***   
 (0.1473) (0.0570)   
1 Month After Tax Change     
Dummy -0.0557  -0.4194***  
 (0.1505)  (0.0831)  
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase -0.3936** -0.4460***   
 (0.1280) (0.0758)   
2 Months After Tax Change     
Dummy 0.1352  -0.0398  
 (0.1639)  (0.0463)  
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase -0.1806 -0.0557*   
 (0.1475) (0.0273)    
Constant 5.1889*** 5.1916*** 5.2268*** 5.4301*** 
 (0.1633) (0.1587)  (0.1715) (0.1320) 
Obs. 665 665 665 665 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.761 0.712 
Notes: Significance levels (robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, and * 0.10. Column (1) shows the results 
for the specification of the equation in Section 5.1. In column (2), we leave out the plain anticipation dummies. The 
regression in column (3) omits the interaction terms. Column (4) presents the results of the regression without controlling 
for anticipation effects around the increase notches. 
6. Robustness exercises 
For robustness exercises, we apply a number of different specifications to our model. 
First, we consider different lengths for the anticipation period by comparing the baseline 
regressions with two dummy variables before and after tax increases with the case of one 
and three dummy variables. In Section 6.2 below, we control for the possible effects of 
a temporary suspension of the real estate transfer tax for housing companies and coop-
eratives. Because this policy measure only affects Brandenburg in our data, our robust-
ness regressions omit Brandenburg from the sample. Section 6.3 omits both Brandenburg 
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and Berlin to control for housing markets in our sample which might exceed state bor-
ders. In our sample, there are no other parts of interstate municipal areas necessary to 
control for. In Section 6.4, we show further subsample regressions by omitting each 
state, one at a time. Finally, we control for all time periods in which transaction numbers 
might have been influenced by state-level funding programs in Section 6.5. 
6.1 Different lengths of anticipation 
In the baseline setting, we generated dummy variables for the two months before and 
after tax increases. However, transactions might be accelerated over even longer time 
periods. Table 4 shows the regression results for different numbers of anticipation dum-
mies for the first three specifications according to Table 3. For these three specifications, 
the baseline regression is repeated in column 2, supplemented by a version omitting the 
effects two month before and after the tax increase in column 1 and by a version adding 
effects three month before and after the tax increase column 3.  
By adding a version in which only one month before and after a tax increase is considered 
we may create an omitted variable bias. Its size can be quantified by comparing the result 
to the baseline regression.56 By comparing columns 1 to 3 for specifications (1) and (3) we 
find that using more dummy variables reduces the coefficient. However, the difference 
in coefficients when using one and two dummies is greater than in the setting with two 
and three month dummies. As expected, fewer transactions are accelerated when the 
transaction date (without a change in the tax rate) would have been further away from 
the time notch. Interestingly, the anticipation effect is almost irrelevant for more than 
one month around the tax increase. Therefore, we have more confidence in the specifi-
cation with two month dummies before and two month dummies after the time notch. 
However, there are two observations worth highlighting: first, the drop in transactions 
after a tax increase may slightly stretch into the second month, whereas bunching affects 
only the month prior to a tax increase. This corresponds well to the framework laid out 
in Section 3. Second, the sum of additional transactions just before an increase seems 
slightly lower compared to the sum of fewer transactions right after an increase, espe-
                                                   
56 Transactions that are shifted beyond these two months (one lagged and one ahead) are now 
calculated into the time frame before the tax increase. Thus, lower taxes are associated with even 
more transactions. A steep drop in transactions immediately following a tax increase stretching 
out farther than one month is calculated into the time period of a higher tax rate. Both effects 
lead to overestimating the lock-in effects of transfer taxes. 
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cially when we take the second month into account. As we already control for acceler-
ating transactions, seasonal patterns and lock-in effects, we can only speculate about the 
underlying causal mechanism. A possible channel might be of a psychological nature (in 
the sense of loss aversion; Thaler 1985): in the absence of psychological factors, the bar-
gaining solution might be to transact in the month immediately following a tax increase 
despite the higher tax. However, the higher tax liability might be more present psycho-
logically and thus has a higher impact on utility than for transactions taking place even 
later. As a result, more people might be reluctant to transact. Evidence of such overre-
actions to housing policy changes have been found for the case of Shanghai (Zhou 2016). 
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TABLE 4. RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT LENGTHS OF ANTICIPATION 
 Dependent Variable: Log Number of Single-Family Home Transactions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
#month dummies 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Real Estate Trans-
fer Tax Rate 
-0.0626** -0.0581** -0.0547* -0.0628** -0.0589** -0.0550* -0.0705** -0.0690** -0.0692* 
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0243) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0279) 
3 Months Before 
Tax Change          
Dummy   -0.1783      0.0003 
   (0.1070)   0.0319   (0.0732) 
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
  0.1953   (0.0655)    
  (0.1067)       
2 Months Before 
Tax Change          
Dummy  -0.0379 -0.0406     -0.0160 -0.0161 
  (0.2062) (0.2149)     (0.0701) (0.0706) 
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
 0.0282 0.0289  -0.0071 -0.0047    
 (0.1705) (0.1728)  (0.0625) (0.0632)    
1 Month Before 
Tax Change          
Dummy 0.0893 0.0887 0.0878    0.4094*** 0.4076*** 0.4076*** 
 (0.1670) (0.1822) (0.1878)    (0.0811) (0.0858) (0.0846) 
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
0.3404* 0.3403* 0.3432* 0.4222*** 0.4216*** 0.4245***    
(0.1430) (0.1473) (0.1501) (0.0541) (0.0570) (0.0542)    
1 Month After 
Tax Change          
Dummy -0.0492 -0.0557 -0.0576    -0.4160*** -0.4194*** -0.4190*** 
 (0.1516) (0.1505) (0.1511)    (0.0810) (0.0831) (0.0829) 
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
-0.3957** -0.3936** -0.3956** -0.4424*** -0.4460*** -0.4483***    
(0.1350) (0.1280) (0.1257) (0.0740) (0.0758) (0.0738)    
2 Months After 
Tax Change          
Dummy  0.1352 0.1338     -0.0398 -0.0395 
  (0.1639) (0.1712)     (0.0463) (0.0463) 
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
 -0.1806 -0.1813  -0.0557* -0.0579*    
 (0.1475) (0.1533)  (0.0273) (0.0261)    
3 Months After 
Tax Change          
Dummy   0.0756      0.0044 
   (0.1401)      (0.0296) 
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
  -0.0820   -0.0166    
  (0.1299)   (0.0272)    
Constant 5.2047*** 5.1889*** 5.1769*** 5.2051*** 5.1916*** 5.1781*** 5.2323*** 5.2268*** 5.2278*** 
 (0.1426) (0.1633) (0.1684) (0.1415) (0.1587) (0.1652) (0.1528) (0.1715) (0.1746) 
Obs. 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.767 0.765 0.766 0.766 0.760 0.761 0.761 
Notes: Significance levels (robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, and * 0.10. Column (1) shows the results 
for the specification of the equation in Section 5.1. In column (2), we leave out the plain anticipation dummies. The 
regression in column (3) omits the interaction terms. 
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6.2 Temporary suspension of the real estate transfer tax for housing companies and 
cooperatives 
In 2004, the German legislation passed a law that allowed for a temporary suspension of 
the real estate transfer tax for mergers and acquisitions of housing companies and hous-
ing cooperatives in eastern German states (Gesetz zur Grunderwerbsteuerbefreiung bei Fu-
sionen von Wohnungsunternehmen und Wohnungsgenossenschaften in den neuen Ländern, 
BR-Drucksache 51/04). As the assets of housing companies almost exclusively comprise 
real estate, mergers in this sector are usually subject to real estate transfer taxes. This 
regulation aimed to incentivize housing companies and cooperatives to undertake new 
investments and, therefore, to help them grow their businesses; the suspension lasted 
from January 2004 until June 2006 (see Bundesrat 2004).  
As we included three eastern German states in our sample (Berlin, Brandenburg and 
Saxony-Anhalt) and as our chosen time frame overlaps with the temporary suspension 
of the real estate transfer tax, we must consider whether the suspension had an effect on 
the number of transactions. It is possible that some transactions in our sample might not 
have been subject to transfer taxes, and thus, our results could be skewed. However, as 
we analyze single-family home transactions only, we do not expect such an effect to 
show. 
For the case of Saxony-Anhalt, mergers were excluded in the original dataset. In Berlin, 
no mergers of housing companies and housing cooperatives took place between 2004 
and 2006. Thus, we must only remove those mergers that took place in Brandenburg 
from our dataset. According to the Federation of German Housing and Real Estate Com-
panies (Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungs- und Immobilienunternehmen e. V., GdW),57 
15 mergers took place between 2004 and 2006. Unfortunately, no detailed information 
on these mergers is available. Therefore, we control for the entire time frame in which 
the suspension was in place in Brandenburg plus an additional month to take possible 
bunching effects into account. We do this by including a total of 25 dummy variables 
for Brandenburg, one for each month of the time frame.  
If we expect the suspension to influence our analysis, the transaction numbers during 
this time would be higher compared to when transfer taxes are charged. During the rel-
evant time frame, transfer taxes in Brandenburg were only 3.5%. Without controlling 
                                                   
57 In Brandenburg, almost all housing and real estate companies are members of the Federation 
of German Housing and Real Estate Companies (see BBU 2015 and Statistische Ämter des Bundes 
und der Länder 2014). 
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for the suspension, we should find higher transaction numbers for this relatively low 
transaction tax. Thus, our baseline results could be overestimated. Table 5 reports the 
regression results for the four specifications as in Table 3 with and without controlling 
for the suspension in Brandenburg. The coefficients change only marginally. The lock-
in effect is slightly higher, indicating that the baseline model does not suffer from over-
estimation if we do not control for the suspension. 
TABLE 5. RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLLING FOR THE TRANSFER-TAX SUSPENSION 
 Dependent Variable: Log Number of Single-Family Home Transactions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Controlled for Time 
Frame? 
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Real Estate Transfer 
Tax Rate 
-0.0581** -0.0588** -0.0589** -0.0594** -0.0690** -0.0695** -0.1274*** -0.1276*** 
(0.0216) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0207) (0.0256) (0.0249) (0.0266) (0.0258) 
2 Months Before 
Tax Change         
Dummy -0.0379 -0.0457   -0.0160 -0.0161   
 (0.2062) (0.2091)   (0.0701) (0.0743)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
0.0282 0.0363 -0.0071 -0.0060     
(0.1705) (0.1700) (0.0625) (0.0661)     
1 Month Before 
Tax Change         
Dummy 0.0887 0.0809   0.4076*** 0.4074***   
 (0.1822) (0.1851)   (0.0858) (0.0889)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
0.3403* 0.3482* 0.4216*** 0.4226***     
(0.1473) (0.1455) (0.0570) (0.0582)     
1 Month After Tax 
Change         
Dummy -0.0557 -0.0635   -0.4194*** -0.4184***   
 (0.1505) (0.1532)   (0.0831) (0.0845)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
-0.3936** -0.3845** -0.4460*** -0.4439***     
(0.1280) (0.1336) (0.0758) (0.0775)     
2 Months After 
Tax Change         
Dummy 0.1352 0.1260   -0.0398 -0.0411   
 (0.1639) (0.1626)   (0.0463) (0.0464)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
-0.1806 -0.1725 -0.0557* -0.0556*     
(0.1475) (0.1470) (0.0273) (0.0275)     
Constant 5.1889*** 5.2159*** 5.1916*** 5.2180*** 5.2268*** 5.2529*** 5.4301*** 5.4548*** 
 (0.1633) (0.2032) (0.1587) (0.1991) (0.1715) (0.2100) (0.1320) (0.1659) 
Obs. 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.770 0.766 0.770 0.761 0.764 0.712 0.716 
Notes: Significance levels (robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, and * 0.10. Column (1) shows the results 
for the specification in Section 5.1. In column (2), we leave out the plain anticipation dummies. The regression in column 
(3) omits the interaction terms. Column (4) presents the results of the regression without controlling for the anticipation 
effects around the increase notches. 
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6.3 Regional border effects 
When potential buyers just marginally prefer one state to another in a migration sce-
nario, an increase in real estate transfer taxes might influence the decision of where to 
move. Thus, we might see market activity that has nothing to do with transfer taxes in 
that particular state but with raised taxes in a neighboring state.  
As stated in Section 5.1, people should rarely be on the verge of indifference when it 
comes to migrating to one state or another. Germany has scarcely any pairs of areas that 
are located in different states that qualify as regional substitutes. In addition, area-specific 
differences other than geographical differences should have an impact on the housing 
decision. After all, two areas of different federal states are also located in different dis-
tricts and different municipalities. The area-specific characteristics therefore also com-
prise all specific characteristics at different federal levels. 
Nonetheless, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that the real estate transfer tax in 
one area affects market activity in another geographically close area of a different state. 
To a great extent, this concern can be eliminated by taking a closer look at our dataset. 
Affected areas might be so-called twin-metropolitan areas in which urban areas of two 
different states are located on opposite sides of the border, such as in some areas in Rhine-
land-Palatinate. Fortunately, our dataset does not include those particular areas.58 In ad-
dition, the housing market in city-states like Bremen and Berlin, which are embedded in 
Lower Saxony and Brandenburg respectively, might be interdependent with the sur-
rounding state. To the benefit of our analysis, Lower Saxony implements the exact same 
tax increases as Bremen, thus not distorting the interdependence of these two states and 
not causing any bias in our data for Bremen. However, since Berlin and Brandenburg 
differ in their transfer tax measures, our baseline results might be biased by border effects 
between these two states. 
Table 6 compares the results of the four specifications of our baseline regressions with 
the omission of Berlin and Brandenburg from our dataset. Notably, in the remaining 
states, the bunching effects are somewhat smaller and less symmetric. For the lock-in 
                                                   
58 Ludwigshafen am Rhein and Mannheim in Baden-Wuerttemberg, in addition to Mainz and 
Wiesbaden in Hesse, qualify as twin-metropolitan areas. However, none of these cities are in-
cluded in our data (see Section 4). 
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effects, the coefficients lose significance. This is not surprising, considering the substan-
tially smaller sample size. Since the coefficients are only slightly lower, our previous 
findings are confirmed. 
TABLE 6. RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT BERLIN AND BRANDENBURG 
 Dependent Variable: Log Number of Single-Family Home Transactions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Brandenburg or Berlin 
included? 
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Real Estate Transfer Tax Rate -0.0581** -0.0504 -0.0589** -0.0497 -0.0690** -0.0614 -0.1274*** -0.1219*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0268) (0.0215) (0.0270) (0.0256) (0.0369) (0.0266) (0.0160) 
2 Months Before Tax Change         
Dummy -0.0379 -0.0299   -0.0160 -0.0266   
 (0.2062) (0.3529)   (0.0701) (0.1175)   
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 0.0282 0.0045 -0.0071 -0.0235     
 (0.1705) (0.2553) (0.0625) (0.0799)     
1 Month Before Tax Change         
Dummy 0.0887 0.0250   0.4076*** 0.3237**   
 (0.1822) (0.2960)   (0.0858) (0.0956)   
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 0.3403* 0.3285 0.4216*** 0.3512***     
 (0.1473) (0.2420) (0.0570) (0.0388)     
1 Month After Tax Change         
Dummy -0.0557 0.0535   -0.4194*** -0.3790*   
 (0.1505) (0.2672)   (0.0831) (0.1407)   
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 
-0.3936** -0.4716 -
0.4460*** 
-0.4221**     
 (0.1280) (0.2500) (0.0758) (0.1280)     
2 Months After Tax Change         
Dummy 0.1352 0.1088   -0.0398 -0.0120   
 (0.1639) (0.0960)   (0.0463) (0.0625)   
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase -0.1806 -0.1326 -0.0557* -0.0322     
 (0.1475) (0.1409) (0.0273) (0.0596)     
Constant 5.1889*** 5.0523*** 5.1916*** 5.0499*** 5.2268*** 5.0908*** 5.4301*** 5.3011*** 
 (0.1633) (0.3474) (0.1587) (0.3480) (0.1715) (0.3648) (0.1320) (0.2225) 
Obs. 665 417 665 417 665 417 665 417 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.778 0.766 0.778 0.761 0.773 0.712 0.745 
Notes: Significance levels (robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, and * 0.10. Column (1) shows the results 
for the specification in Section 5.1. In column (2), we leave out the plain anticipation dummies. The regression in column 
(3) omits the interaction terms. Column (4) presents the results of the regression without controlling for the anticipation 
effects around the increase notches. 
6.4 Further subsamples 
In addition to excluding Berlin and Brandenburg from our regression, we now regress 
specification (1) of the baseline regressions in Table 3 while omitting one state at a time. 
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In this manner, we can analyze whether our coefficients are determined by observations 
in individual states. 
The results are shown in Table 7. The anticipation effects are very robust against the 
omission of states in the sample. Although the anticipation dummies and the interaction 
dummies vary strongly for different subsamples, aggregating these coefficients for the 
case of a one-percentage-point increase in the tax rate reduces most of that variance. The 
coefficient for the real estate transfer tax rate ranges from 4.5% to 7.5%. The results 
suggest that the size of tax increase is not equally important throughout the German 
states. Interestingly, we find the largest differences in the transfer tax coefficient when 
we omit Berlin and Brandenburg. We would expect possible border effects (see Section 
6.3) between these two states to lead to an overestimation of the transfer tax effect. How-
ever, by only including Brandenburg, we might overestimate our results, whereas in-
cluding Berlin may lead to underestimation.59 This suggests that the border effect occurs 
in one direction: households might buy a house in Berlin instead of Brandenburg when 
Brandenburg increases its tax rate. However, this result has to be treated with the out-
most caution, since omitting entire states from the analysis considerably curtails our 
sample. Also, the real estate transfer tax coefficient loses significance for the omission of 
Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt. Although the coefficients still 
point in the same direction at similar magnitudes, these results suggest that the causal 
effect of the relation between the quantity of single-family home transactions and the 
real estate transfer tax is not equally large in all German states. 
                                                   
59 As shown above, when we omit both states, the coefficients are quite robust (see Section 6.3). 
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TABLE 7. RESULTS FOR SUBSAMPLES 
 Dependent Variable: Log Number of Single-Family Home Transactions 
State omitted None Berlin 
Branden-
burg 
Bremen 
Rhineland- 
Palatinate 
Saarland 
Saxony- 
Anhalt 
Real Estate Transfer Tax Rate -0.0581** -0.0745** -0.0450 -0.0611* -0.0469 -0.0714** -0.0475  
 (0.0216) (0.0207) (0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0321) (0.0175) (0.0317)  
2 Months Before Tax Change        
Dummy -0.0379 0.0362 -0.1061 -0.2476** 0.0255 -0.0094 0.1368 
 (0.2062) (0.3208) (0.1899) (0.0703) (0.1966) (0.1964) (0.3103)  
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 0.0282 -0.0535 0.0997 0.2021* -0.0678 -0.0064 -0.0656  
 (0.1705) (0.2389) (0.1450) (0.0786) (0.1975) (0.1785) (0.2678)  
1 Month Before Tax Change        
Dummy 0.0887 0.0973 0.0219 -0.0481 0.1003 0.0792 0.3010 
 (0.1822) (0.2891) (0.1767) (0.1153) (0.2041) (0.1978) (0.1581)  
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase 0.3403* 0.2800 0.4020* 0.4532*** 0.3169 0.3654* 0.2024 
 (0.1473) (0.2385) (0.1468) (0.0659) (0.1944) (0.1623) (0.1630)  
1 Month After Tax Change        
Dummy -0.0557 0.0586 -0.0387 0.0404 -0.1609 -0.0984 -0.1997 
 (0.1505) (0.2295) (0.1636) (0.2442) (0.1011) (0.1376) (0.1003) 
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase -0.3936** -0.4489* -0.4205* -0.4679* -0.2411 -0.4236** -0.2917**  
 (0.1280) (0.1917) (0.1699) (0.1736) (0.1175) (0.1070) (0.0779) 
2 Months After Tax Change        
Dummy 0.1352 0.2506 0.0453 -0.0000 0.2027 0.1158 0.2203  
 (0.1639) (0.2052) (0.1038) (0.1315) (0.1680) (0.1729) (0.2692) 
Dummy * Size of Tax Increase -0.1806 -0.2552 -0.0887 -0.0606 -0.2536 -0.1870 -0.2686 
 (0.1475) (0.1872) (0.1078) (0.1138) (0.1539) (0.1451) (0.2372) 
Constant 5.1889*** 5.2646*** 5.0402*** 5.4536*** 5.0588*** 5.2627*** 5.0420*** 
 (0.1633) (0.1956) (0.2329) (0.1618) (0.2145) (0.1780) (0.0885)  
Obs. 665 537 545 545 542 617 539  
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.779 0.752 0.832 0.747 0.771 0.798  
Notes: Significance levels (robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, and * 0.10. 
6.5 Funding programs 
Our main hypothesis is that some real estate transactions do not take place due to higher 
transaction costs in the form of real estate transfer taxes. The model outlined in Section 3 
suggests that the mechanism underlying this relation also applies in the opposite direc-
tion: ceteris paribus, we expect more transactions to take place if transactions are subsi-
dized via funding programs. The funding programs that potentially have an impact on 
our transaction data are summarized in Table 14 in the appendix. In all of our regressions, 
we work with date dummies to capture time-specific effects that apply to all included 
states. These dummies fully control for the effects of the ‘Eigenheimzulage’ and ‘Eigen-
heimrente’ funding programs. The state-level ‘IBB Familienbaudarlehen’ funding program 
has been in place in Berlin since March 2015. Thus, it is not within the time span of our 
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sample. We also do not need to control for the funding program in Saarland, since it has 
been effective since April 2008, fully covering the time frame for Saarland in our sample. 
The two funding programs that might influence our data are those operated by the ILB 
in Brandenburg and the ISB in Rhineland-Palatinate. Since these programs offer low-
priced loans when certain conditions are met, they do not counterbalance transfer taxes 
directly. We control for both programs by implementing dummy variables in the same 
fashion as in Section 6.2: for Brandenburg, we generate dummy variables for each month 
in which the ILB program was in place. Additionally, we add one month prior to the 
introduction of the funding program to take anticipation effects into account. We follow 
the same procedure for Rhineland-Palatinate. Overall, we add 53 dummy variables to 
the regression. 
The funding programs in Brandenburg and Rhineland-Palatinate are effective during 
time frames with above-average tax rates. Thus, if the funding programs were effective 
for our dataset, we would expect to find higher transaction numbers compared to a sce-
nario without funding. Therefore, the coefficient we measured in our baseline regression 
would be underestimated. The regression results for the four specifications as in Table 3 
are displayed in Table 8. The anticipation effects almost remain unchanged compared to 
the baseline regression. We have to consider that adding state- and time-specific dummy 
variables has the effect of curtailing our dataset. However, the results suggest that the 
funding programs cause slight underestimation in our baseline results and that the true 
influence of real estate transfer taxes might be even stronger. 
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TABLE 8. RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLLING FOR FUNDING PROGRAMS 
 Dependent Variable: Log Number of Single-Family Home Transactions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Funding programs 
controlled for? 
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Real Estate Trans-
fer Tax Rate 
-0.0581** -0.0658 -0.0589** -0.0665* -0.0690** -0.0770* -0.1274*** -0.1308** 
(0.0216) (0.0332) (0.0215) (0.0329) (0.0256) (0.0370) (0.0266) (0.0365) 
2 Months Before 
Tax Change         
Dummy -0.0379 -0.0660   -0.0160 -0.0267   
 (0.2062) (0.2020)   (0.0701) (0.0717)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
0.0282 0.0464 -0.0071 -0.0140     
(0.1705) (0.1775) (0.0625) (0.0682)     
1 Month Before 
Tax Change         
Dummy 0.0887 0.0518   0.4076*** 0.3900***   
 (0.1822) (0.1660)   (0.0858) (0.0859)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
0.3403* 0.3575* 0.4216*** 0.4050***     
(0.1473) (0.1455) (0.0570) (0.0617)     
1 Month After 
Tax Change         
Dummy -0.0557 0.0026   -0.4194*** -0.3949***   
 (0.1505) (0.1419)   (0.0831) (0.0687)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
-0.3936** -0.4241** -0.4460*** -0.4226***     
(0.1280) (0.1230) (0.0758) (0.0654)     
2 Months After 
Tax Change         
Dummy 0.1352 0.1414   -0.0398 -0.0355   
 (0.1639) (0.1695)   (0.0463) (0.0327)   
Dummy * Size of 
Tax Increase 
-0.1806 -0.1791 -0.0557* -0.0516     
(0.1475) (0.1655) (0.0273) (0.0286)     
Constant 5.1889*** 5.2156*** 5.1916*** 5.2179*** 5.2268*** 5.2548*** 5.4301*** 5.4420*** 
 (0.1633) (0.1901) (0.1587) (0.1854) (0.1715) (0.1991) (0.1320) (0.1706) 
Obs. 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.783 0.766 0.783 0.761 0.777 0.712 0.736 
Notes: Significance levels (robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, and * 0.10. Column (1) shows the results 
for the specification in Section 5.1. In column (2), we leave out the plain anticipation dummies. The regression in column 
(3) omits the interaction terms. Column (4) presents the results of the regression without controlling for the anticipation 
effects around the increase notches. 
7. Conclusion 
The real estate transfer tax is a major part of all transaction costs in property purchases 
in Germany. An increase in the tax rate makes real estate acquisitions significantly more 
expensive. We conclude that the announcement of an increase in the real estate transfer 
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tax leads to a significant reaction in the housing market: many market participants ac-
celerate planned transactions to take advantage of the lower tax rate. Moreover, a drastic 
drop in transactions can be observed immediately after the tax increase.  
However, the tax change also leads to long lasting lock-in effects: due to the higher tax 
rate, transactions become less attractive for buyers and sellers and therefore market ac-
tivity decreases. The increase in the tax rate might be particularly relevant for so-called 
‘threshold households’, which were just able or willing to buy a house and for which 
even slight changes in the tax rate can cause greater financial burdens that they may not 
be able or willing to carry. Our results show that a one-percentage-point increase in the 
tax rate is accompanied by 6% fewer transactions. This finding questions the wisdom of 
real estate transfer tax increases when other political measures that attempt to support 
homeownership creation are in place.  
Transfer taxes increase moving costs, which can cause further distortions (see Kawata et 
al. 2016). These effects on the economy as a whole require further research. We show 
that in many cases, the former first-best option – to buy or sell a single-family home – is 
apparently no longer the optimal choice for a household. Thus, we expect ownership 
rates to decrease as letting apartments becomes more attractive than selling and renting 
becomes more attractive than buying. Additionally, households are likely to remain in 
non-ideal housing as relocation becomes more expensive. Retired households, which 
tend to stay in houses that are too large after their children have left, could be discour-
aged from downsizing to their actual needs (see Glaeser and Luttmer 2003). Individuals 
may forgo better job offers in other regions or accept longer commutes, which can have 
negative consequences on urban labor markets (see, for example, Ross and Zenou 2008). 
All of these adverse effects are consequences if fewer transactions. Therefore, by showing 
the negative effect of transfer taxes on the quantity of transactions, we have proven the 
necessary condition for any of those inefficient market distortions to be present. Identi-
fying the individual behavioral responses to higher real estate transfer taxes constitutes 
a fruitful field for future research. 
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10. Appendix 
FIGURE 12. AVERAGE SHARE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF COSTS ON TRANSACTION COSTS OF 
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, 2011
 
Notes: The figure shows the average share of different types of costs on the total transaction costs of property transactions 
in Germany for 2011. Transaction costs include notary and legal fees, real estate agent (broker’s) fees and real estate transfer 
taxes. Data: Andrews et al. (2011). 
Supplemental Information 
Following transfer taxes, real estate agent and notary fees also play a significant part in the 
total transaction costs. With regard to real estate agent fees, there is no legislative basis stipu-
lating a certain fee level. Thus, real estate agents can theoretically ask for individual fees. How-
ever, agents typically align themselves to the fees suggested by the umbrella organization in 
their respective German state. During the time frame of our analysis, there has been no change 
in this suggested fee level recommended by these umbrella organizations. As a result, we do 
not include changes in real estate agent fees in our analysis. Notary fees, legal fees and registra-
tion fees are legally fixed and uniform rates are applied across all German states. 
Real Estate
Transfer Tax
52%
Notary Fees
19%
Real Estate Agent 
Fees
17%
Legal
Fees
7%
Registration Fees
5%
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TABLE 9. OVERVIEW OF TAXATION SYSTEMS FOR HOUSING TRANSACTIONS IN DIFFERENT 
COUNTRIES 
 
Country 
Average share of real 
estate transfer tax on 
total transaction 
costsa 
Real estate transfer 
tax rate 
Tax scale 
Possibility 
for tax ex-
emptions 
and reduc-
tions 
Formal tax 
payer 
Compe-
tent tax 
author-
ity 
Australia 73% 4% n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Belgium 59% 10%c flat yes n. a. n. a. 
Bulgaria n. a. 10%c n. a. yes buyer local 
Denmark n. a. <5%c flat yes n. a. n. a. 
Germany 52% 3.5-6.5%c flat yes buyer local 
Finland 89% 2-4%b flat yes buyer central 
France n. a. 5.1%b flat n. a. buyer local 
Greece n. a. 3.1%b flat n. a. buyer central 
United Kingdom 88% 0-15%c progressive yes buyer central 
Ireland 89% <5%c flat n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Iceland 43% 2%a n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Italy 6% 2%c flat  yes n. a. n. a. 
Canada 61% 1%a n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Croatia n. a. 5%b flat n. a. buyer central 
Latvia n. a. 0.5-3%b flat yes n. a. central 
Luxembourg n. a. 7%b flat n. a. buyer central 
Malta n. a. 5%b flat n. a. seller central 
Netherlands 52% 2-6%b flat no buyer central 
Norway 56% 3%a n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Austria 55% 3.5%b flat yes buyer local 
Poland 26% 2%c flat n. a. buyer central 
Portugal 50% 5-6.5%b progressive yes buyer central 
Rumania n. a. <5%c flat n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Sweden 98% 1.5%b flat n. a. buyer central 
Switzerland 28% 2%a n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Slovenia n. a. <5%c flat n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Spain 79% 7%c flat n. a. seller local 
South Korea 57% 3%a n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Czech Republic 39% 4%b flat n. a. seller central 
Turkey 14% 1%a n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Hungary 79% 2-4%b progressive Yes buyer central 
United States 12% 1%a n. a. Yes seller local 
Cyprus n. a. 3-8%c progressive Yes buyer central 
Notes: The table gives an overview of differences in the tax system for housing transactions in countries for which data 
are available. a) Data from 2009. b) Data from 2014. c) Data from 2015. Data: Oxley and Haffner (2010), Andrews et al. 
(2011), Ernst & Young (2014), European Commission (2015). 
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TABLE 10. OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX INCREASES IN GERMAN 
STATES 
State 
Date of Tax 
Increase 
New Tax 
Rate 
Official Justification 
Berlin 01/2007 4.5% Consolidation of budgets, generation of revenues 
 04/2012 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states 
 01/2014 6.0% Generation of revenues  
Brandenburg 01/2011 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
 07/2015 6.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
aiming for structurally balanced budgets 
Baden-Württemberg 05/2011 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, decrease of burden of municipal funds, financing ex-
penditures on families and children 
Bremen 01/2011 4.5% Aiming for structurally balanced budgets 
 01/2014 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states 
Hesse 01/2013 5.0% Meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, convergence of tax rates of 
all states 
 08/2014 6.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
Hamburg 01/2009 4.5% Meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, financing expenditures on 
families and climate-change related instruments 
Mecklenburg West-
ern Pomerania 
07/2012 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states 
Lower Saxony 01/2011 4.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
 01/2014 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states 
North Rhine-West-
phalia 
10/2011 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states, decrease of burden of municipal funds 
 01/2015 6.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
Rhineland-Palati-
nate 
03/2012 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states 
Schleswig-Holstein 01/2012 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
 01/2014 6.5% Convergence of tax rates of all states 
Saarland 01/2011 4.0% Meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, decrease of burden of mu-
nicipal funds 
 01/2012 4.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
convergence of tax rates of all states, financing of expenditures on education 
and families 
 01/2013 5.5% Meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
 01/2015 6.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
Saxony-Anhalt 03/2010 4.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’, 
aiming for structurally balanced budgets, financing of expenditures on educa-
tion and research 
 03/2012 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, financing of expenditures on education and research 
Thuringia 04/2011 5.0% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
 01/2017 6.5% Consolidation of budgets, meeting borrowing limits imposed by ‘debt brake’ 
Source: Own translation based on official announcements from German state governments. 
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TABLE 11. MARKET SHARE OF AVERAGE PRICE OF SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES IN DIFFERENT 
GERMAN STATES, 2011 
 
 
Share of People living in 
Single-Family Homesa  
Share of Single-Family Homes of 
all Residential Buildings 
Average Transaction Price of 
Single-Family Homes 
Berlin 14% 54% € 294,261.91 
Brandenburg 57% 84% € 124,355.66 
Bremen 42% 75% € 174,307.93 
Rhineland-Palatinate 66% 84% € 169,826.03 
Saarland 72% 87% € 156,352.87 
Saxony-Anhalt 51% 79% € 75,386.19 
Notes: The table presents the share of people living in single-family homes in the total population and the share of single-
family homes out of all residential buildings in different German states in 2011. a) Single-family homes are defined as 
dwellings with one or two apartments. Data: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2014) and Property Valuation 
Committees of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Saxony-Anhalt (2015). 
TABLE 12. NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS FOR DIFFERENT REAL ESTATE TYPES IN BERLIN AND 
BRANDENBURG, 2012 
 Berlin Brandenburg 
Total number of transactions 5,453 11,986 
Single-family home transactions 3,265 9,351 
Apartment building transactions 1,653 1,517 
Commercial property transactions 358 715 
Others 177 403 
Notes: The table presents the total number of real estate transactions and transactions of different real estate types in Berlin 
and Brandenburg in 2012. Single-family homes form the largest share of all real estate transactions in both states. Data on 
other German states were unfortunately not available. Data: Arbeitskreis der Gutachterausschüsse und Oberen Gut-
achterausschüsse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2014). 
TABLE 13. RESULTS OF THE CONDITIONAL (FIXED EFFECTS) LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Discrete response variable for a tax in-
crease (1 if a tax increase, 0 otherwise) 
Real estate transfer tax revenues (log) 5.1075 
 (6.8204) 
Government ideology (log) 2.2059 
 (10.0905) 
Public debt per capita (log) 12.8665** 
 (5.9318) 
Combined taxes per capita 2.2572 
 (6.1559) 
Obs. 153 
Notes: Significance levels (standard errors in brackets): ** 0.05. The table shows the results for the coefficients (not mar-
ginal effects) of the conditional (fixed effects) logistic panel regression for the specification below. Data: Statistisches 
Bundesamt (2016 and 2017), official announcements from German state governments and Bundesministerium der Finan-
zen (2015). 
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Supplemental Information 
Following Krause and Potrafke (2016), we examine the determinants of whether a state in-
creased its tax rate with the following model: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛽 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
𝐹(… ) is the logistic function and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a discrete response variable of a tax increase satisfying: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
On the right hand side, 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 measures the tax revenues of real estate transfer taxes 
in state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 assumes ideology-induced policy making and 
measures the share of rightwing governments in office in state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
measures the amount of debt per capita of in state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, and 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 measures the other main tax revenues of German states per 
capita (i.e., income taxes, corporate taxes and value-added taxes). 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. We use 
all explanatory variables measured in 𝑡 − 1 because decisions on the tax rate are usually made 
in the year before the adjustment takes place (see Krause and Potrafke 2016). 
TABLE 14. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC FUNDING INSTRUMENTS ENCOURAGING HOMEOWNERSHIP 
IN GERMANY 
Name Funding Type 
Geographical Cov-
erage 
Funding Amount Funding Period 
Eigenheimzulage tax allowance Germany 1% of purchase price until 12/2005 
Eigenheimrente loan/tax allowance Germany €154-454 annually since 01/2008 
IBB Familienbaudarlehen loan Berlin max. 60% of collateral value since 03/2015 
ILB Brandenburg Kredit loan/grant Brandenburg max. €50,000  since 01/2013 
ISB Darlehen Wohneigentum loan 
Rhineland-Palati-
nate 
max. €150,000  since 04/2013 
Saarländische Wohnraumför-
derung 
loan Saarland max. €400/m²  since 04/2008 
Notes: The table presents all public funding instruments encouraging homeownership in Germany that were introduced 
or abolished during the time period of our sample. Funding instruments at the municipal level have been excluded due to 
their limited impact on transactions at the state level. Data: http://www.genios.de and http://www.baufoerderer.de. 
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CHAPTER 4:  EFFICIENCY OF COUNTY ROAD PROVISION* 
Efficiency of County Road Provision 
This chapter analyzes the efficiency of the road provision of local governments using data 
envelopment analysis. The provision of roads is a costly public service, which makes an effi-
ciency analysis in this field an interesting subject. I enhance the previous literature by first, 
examining the differences in the efficiency of eastern German counties while considering the 
age of the foundations of roads, which previous studies have not included due to data limita-
tions. Second, I use a unique dataset on road quality for my efficiency analysis and show that 
efficiency levels differ from studies that apply proxies, such as the number of accidents, to cap-
ture the quality of roads. These findings indicate that there is a great need to develop suitable 
proxy variables to describe government services. Additionally, I show that the correlations 
between efficiency levels and county characteristics vary greatly depending on the quality in-
dicator used.  
1. Introduction 
Technical infrastructure (especially roads) is closely intertwined with housing markets. 
When houses in urban areas are expensive, an adequate road network allows residents to 
locate further away from agglomeration centers. This takes pressure off housing prices 
and infrastructure systems in cities and supports housing markets in rural areas. Moreo-
ver, county roads, which are the research object of this study, are very important for 
                                                   
* This chapter is a slightly amended version of Fritzsche, C. (2018), Analyzing the Efficiency of 
County Road Production – Evidence from Eastern German Counties, German Economic Review, 
forthcoming. 
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rural economic activity and for residents living in rural areas, as these roads connect 
them to agglomeration centers and the respective services they provide. 
Expenditures on roads represent a considerable portion of total building investments in 
public budgets. The general population is highly interested in the efficient provision of 
public goods such as roads because, as tax payers, they provide the funds for these ex-
penditures. In this chapter, I highlight the data limitations of previous studies on the 
efficiency of the provision of roads and propose a method to overcome them. I enhance 
the previous literature by first, examining the differences in the efficiency of eastern 
German counties while considering the age of the foundations of roads, which previous 
studies have not included due to data limitations. Second, I use new data on the quality 
of roads to calculate efficiency scores.  
The results of my study indicate that there are substantial efficiency differences and effi-
ciency reserves in the provision of roads in eastern German counties. In a comparison 
of the results of this study to those of previous studies, the importance of data accuracy 
becomes apparent. As highlighted by Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte (2017a), some of the 
input and output variables in previous studies are not sufficiently specific, and there is a 
great need to develop better proxy variables for local government services. I show that 
efficiency scores differ greatly depending on the quality indicator used. Furthermore, I 
relate these differences in efficiency to county characteristics and observe that the corre-
lations between efficiency scores and county characteristics also vary depending on the 
road quality indicator used. This finding is highly relevant when seeking to identify the 
source of these inefficiencies. 
I begin this chapter with a short overview of the existing literature and detail my own 
contributions to the literature. Next, I discuss the institutional background of the public 
provision of county roads in Germany. Then, I present the method and data and provide 
a detailed discussion of the results related to the technical efficiency of road provision in 
eastern German counties. Finally, I show how the results differ depending on the quality 
measure used and perform a robustness exercise. 
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2. Literature review 
My research adds to the literature on ‘sector-specific’ efficiency, where only a particular 
public service, such as street cleaning, water supply or road maintenance, is evaluated.60 
The advantage of a sector-specific efficiency analysis is that it is more straightforward to 
identify a certain public good and study the relationship between the provision of that 
good and the respective expenditures. However, data on the inputs and outputs related 
to the efficiency of a sector-specific public good are rarely available. Therefore, the em-
pirical literature on each sector is very limited. In the following, I briefly discuss studies 
concerning the provision of public roads (see Table 25 in the appendix for a summary of 
the results of previous studies).  
The efficiency of road provision is an excellent case in point: roads are an important 
public good that should be provided by authorities in countries all over the world. Usu-
ally, expenditures related to the investment in and maintenance of roads are quite high; 
therefore, they represent a considerable portion of public budgets (see Table 26 in the 
appendix). County roads are especially important for people living in rural areas, as they 
maintain connections to agglomeration centers and the respective services and amenities 
they provide. Further, county roads play an important role in rural economic activity.  
The first generation of literature on the efficient provision of roads incorporated only 
the ‘quantity’ of roads (e.g., the length of the road network) as the relevant output indi-
cator: Deller and Nelson (1991) investigate rural municipalities in Illinois, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin using four input variables (expenditures for full-time employees, road graders, 
single axle trucks and surfacing materials) and one output variable (road length). The 
authors identify considerable efficiency reserves and find that larger townships tend to 
be more efficient in the provision of rural roads. Deller and Halstead (1994) investigate 
various municipalities in New England. As input variables, they use the annual operating 
expenditures on town roads, including the wages of people employed in road mainte-
nance and the depreciation rates for motorized graders and single axle dump trucks. The 
authors also use the length of the town roads as the output variable. Similar to Deller 
and Nelson (1991), the authors find considerable differences in efficiency and a great po-
tential to enhance efficiency. While these early studies provide a good foundation for 
                                                   
60 Another possibility is to evaluate the overall efficiency of local governments by considering 
not only one but a variety of services (i.e., a ‘global’ efficiency analysis). Numerous studies have 
followed this approach (for a recent literature review, see Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 2017a 
and 2017b). However, these studies face difficulties defining a comprehensive set of reasonable 
input and output variables that can fully describe all of the local government’s activities. 
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research on the efficiency of road provision, they did not consider the quality of the road 
network as an output variable and mainly focused on the quantity of roads (i.e., the 
length of the road network). However, quality differences may influence the efficiency 
scores of public services (Balaguer-Coll et al. 2007): often, the decisions regarding the 
expenditures of local governments are not concerned with a change in the quantity of 
the outputs but rather their quality. Therefore, studies incorporating quality indicators 
are especially informative for local governments (Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 2017a). 
A second generation of studies enhanced the previous literature by considering this idea 
and incorporating the quality of public goods as an output variable. Rouse et al. (1997) 
were the first to do so in their study on highway provision in New Zealand. The authors 
use the expenditures of highways as the input variable and the length of the highway 
network (quantity) as an output variable. To measure the quality of the highways, the 
authors calculate an index based on recorded defects (such as potholes, cracks and di-
gouts) observed in the road network. Rouse et al. (1997) find considerable scale effects 
and some efficiency reserves. Kalb (2014) examines differences in the efficiency of the 
road provision of counties in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. He uses total 
expenditures on county roads as the input variable. Kalb (2014) employs the area of 
county roads as a quantity output and the number of accidents due to poor road condi-
tions as a quality output.61 He finds efficiency reserves on a similar scale as Rouse et al. 
(1997). Although the quality variable enriched the efficiency analysis, the author admits 
that he uses a proxy for true road quality that rests on the assumption that an increase 
in the number of accidents is due to poorer structural road conditions. In this case, the 
number of accidents is negatively correlated with the quality of the roads. Any assump-
tion on the correlation, though, implies that driving behavior is to a certain extent inde-
pendent of road quality. In fact, an increase in the number of accidents could also be 
caused by good road condition (see Kalb 2014). As highlighted by Mankiw (2017), people 
might change their behavior when the costs and benefits change:62 drivers operate their 
cars in a way that comfort, speed and the prevention of accidents are in balance. When 
the road is in bad condition, drivers may drive more carefully, i.e., slower, at the benefits 
of increasing accident prevention and the cost of needing more time. Therefore, the 
                                                   
61 That statistic captures accidents caused by a slippery surface as well as poor condition of the 
surface. Thus, only a part of the accident numbers reported is due to a poor structural condition 
of the road. 
62 Mankiw (2017) describes a situation in which the introduction of a seat belt law causes people 
to drive faster and less carefully; therefore, its net effect on the number of deaths from driving is 
ambiguous: drivers wearing a seat belt are more likely to survive any given accident but they are 
also more likely to be in an accident.  
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number of accidents may be dependent on the condition of the road to a low extent 
only. Studies on the causes of accidents consequently find that the quality of the road 
does not have a high impact on the number of accidents.63 Therefore, to assess efficiency 
of road provision, it would be more suitable to measure the quality of the roads with an 
index that measures actual road conditions. Rouse et al. (1997) proposed an index that 
measures road condition to express road quality. However, data constraints did not al-
low Kalb (2014) to perform such an analysis.  
But even if the quality of the road surface can be measured satisfyingly, there is a mech-
anism that puts the results of efficiency analyses using only these data into question. A 
lower quality of a road may be a result of the aging process of roads such that higher 
maintenance costs arise without any inefficient use of public funds. Therefore, I propose 
the development of a third generation of efficiency analyses that also consider the age of 
the foundation of the road network. The mechanical process that describes the deterio-
ration of the surface (and thus the quality of roads and increasing maintenance costs) can 
be separated into two categories (Habiballah and Chazallon 2005): first, the short-term 
mechanical process (horizontal stress), which is activated by vehicle use (the effect of this 
process is usually very small and reversible) and second, the long-term mechanical pro-
cess (vertical stress), which is caused by ground water flows, creep processes in the clay, 
or long-term settlement after a large amount of vehicle use. Regarding vertical stress, a 
permanent deformation in the foundation leads to a modification of any layer above it 
(the unbound base and the pavement) and eventually results in a deformation (also per-
manent) of the surface (see Werkmeister 2003, Habiballah and Chazallon 2005 and Fig-
ure 13). Pavement tests show that 30 to 70% of surface rutting is attributed to this long-
term mechanical process (Little 1993). 
                                                   
63 For example, Butterwegge (2001) finds that the quality of a road (in terms of the number of 
cracks, patches or other types of road damage) does not have an impact on the number of acci-
dents. Bräuninger (2007) shows that only 20% of roads on which accidents have occurred have a 
significant number of cracks and patches. A study conducted by Tenzinger (1989) provides evi-
dence that only the grip of the road affects the number of accidents. Other factors describing the 
condition of roads (pavement evenness, rut depth, cracks and patches) were only slightly corre-
lated with accidents in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, Gruner (2009) finds that low road qual-
ity (measured by an index including different defects in the road network such as the grip of 
roads, pavement evenness, rut depth, cracks, and patches) leads to fewer accidents. 
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FIGURE 13. ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEFORMATION OF ROAD SURFACE DUE TO DEFORMATION 
IN ITS FOUNDATION 
 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates the possible deformation of road surface due to a deformation in its foundation. The picture 
on the left illustrates a case with no deformation of the surface because the underlying layers, as the foundation, are even. 
The picture on the right illustrates the deformation of all the layers due to a deformation in its foundation. Source: Own 
illustration following Vogt (2013). 
Generally speaking, foundations slowly deteriorate with age (Beckers et al. 2009 and 
Vogt 2013). As a result, an old road network asks for more frequent maintenance and 
thus higher costs because its surface is deteriorated due to vertical stress (Little 1993).  
Therefore, it is possible that governments with an older road network in their region 
could be identified as less efficient than governments with a newer road network, even 
if they do not actually employ their financial resources in a less efficient manner. To my 
knowledge, there is no available data on the extent of the deformation of the foundation 
of roads and data on the age of roads in Germany is not available. However, I believe it 
is highly necessary in efficiency analysis to consider the foundation of a road network. 
Thus, I suggest – as a third generation of efficiency analyses – to compare only regions 
for which the road networks are of the same age. 
My study adds to the previous literature by overcoming the limitations of previous stud-
ies, as highlighted above, and has two major differences related to the data: first, I follow 
the second generation of studies examining the efficiency of road provision by using a 
unique dataset on the quality of county roads in Germany. Second, I enhance the previ-
ous literature by conducting a study that represents the first of a third generation of 
efficiency analyses on the efficiency of road provision. In this analysis, I compare the 
expenditure decisions of local governments only in eastern German counties. The age of 
the road networks in eastern Germany is very similar, as after the reunification large 
investments were implemented to modernize aged roads. I provide details on this cir-
cumstance in the following section. 
Pavement (asphalt) 
Unbound base 
Foundation 
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3. Institutional background 
Germany provides an excellent setting for an empirical efficiency analysis. First, German 
counties are a good research subject because they rely on the same institutional frame-
work but differences in expenditure decisions are to be expected (see also Kalb 2014):64 
counties constitute the third layer of government beneath the federal and the state levels 
and are distinguished as either rural (Landkreise) or urban (Kreisfreie Städte) counties. 
Urban counties simultaneously represent a county and a (one) municipality, while rural 
counties represent several municipalities. Eastern Germany65 consists of 76 counties of 
which 58 are rural and 18 are urban. Counties differ in size and demographic structure: 
the population size of rural counties range from roughly 56,800 to 347,700 inhabitants 
and their population density ranges from 37 to 348 inhabitants per square kilometer (as 
of 31/12/2012, Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2017). Access to capital 
markets is the same across all counties.66 Furthermore, counties are guaranteed the right 
to local self-government according to the German constitution. They exhibit considera-
ble responsibility regarding expenditures, particularly, those for road construction and 
maintenance, social security, youth welfare and certain expenditures for education and 
public transport (see Table 15), while legislation is often at the federal level.67 As in other 
countries, the investments of local governments in Germany in roads represent a con-
siderable portion of their total building investments (see Table 26 and Figure 15 in the 
appendix). 
                                                   
64 County functions may differ to some extent, e.g., urban counties combine county functions 
and municipal functions. 
65 Because my sample includes eastern German counties, I provide supporting information only 
on institutions in Eastern Germany. 
66 There is no difference in risk premiums for interest rates between German jurisdictions as the 
German constitution implies a full bailout guarantee for all public entities. 
67 Due to extensive tax sharing and fiscal equalization payments, counties’ budgetary autonomy 
is somewhat limited, and the degree of fiscal autonomy varies across states. Counties do not re-
ceive taxation income directly. They finance their expenditures through transfers from the states 
they are in, by borrowing and by contributions of municipalities within the county, whose size 
is determined as to cover the remaining budgetary needs of the county. 
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TABLE 15. VARIOUS EXPENDITURES AND THEIR SHARE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES (ONLY 
CONSTRUCTION AND PERSONNEL EXPENDITURES) AT THE (RURAL) COUNTY LEVEL, 2014 
 
 
Expenditure Category Expenditures in 2014 (mill. €) Share of Total Expenditures 
General administrationa 4,295.4 35% 
Social security and youthb 2,805.9 23% 
Shaping the environmentc 2,696.4 22% 
          … thereof roads 1,050.6 8% 
Schoolsd 1,763.7 14% 
Health and sportse 1,613.2 5% 
Culture and sciencef 236.4 2% 
Total Expenditures  12,396.4 100% 
Notes: The table shows the expenditures for various categories in mill. € and their percentage of total expenditures for 
construction and personnel at the rural county level (eastern and western German counties), i.e., without urabn counties, 
in 2014. a) Zentrale Verwaltung. b) Soziales und Jugend. c) Gestaltung der Umwelt. d) Schulen und Schulträgeraufgaben. e) 
Gesundheit und Sport. f) Kultur und Wissenschaft. Data: Statistisches Bundesamt (2016). 
Second, public expenditures on roads for each government level can be attributed to a 
specific road type rather accurately. Roads in Germany are classified into four different 
types, and a different government level (federal, state, county and municipality) is re-
sponsible for each type. This classification is as follows: (1) highways (Autobahnen), (2) 
state roads (Landesstraßen), which are mainly used for transit traffic, (3) county roads 
(Kreisstraßen), which are used for traffic between neighboring counties or to connect 
municipalities with supra-local traffic routes68, and (4) municipality roads (Ge-
meindestraßen), which are mainly used for traffic within metropolitan areas.69 In Eastern 
Germany, the length of the county road network in 2015 was approximately 92.000 km. 
Table 16 shows that both state (39%) and county roads (36%) represent a considerable 
share of the total road network outside of urban areas in Eastern Germany. 
                                                   
68 County roads are supposed to end at either a federal highway, a state road, or another county 
road. 
69 In addition, roads that connect municipalities (Gemeindeverbindungsstraßen) are also used to 
connect municipalities to supra-regional road networks. However, this special type of road plays 
only a minor role in the total road network. 
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TABLE 16. ROAD CLASSES AND THEIR SHARE OF THE TOTAL ROAD NETWORK IN EASTERN 
GERMANY, 2015 
Road Class Share of Total Road Network 
Highways 5% 
Federal roads 19% 
State roads 39% 
County roads 36% 
Notes: The table shows the road classes and their share of the total road network outside of metropolitan areas in Eastern 
Germany for 2015. Municipal roads are not included. Data: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017a). 
Third, the case of the eastern German road network is unique: in 1990, the capital stock 
of county roads was equal to zero. In the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
investments in the road infrastructure were very low and a significant portion of the 
existing structure in 1990 had not been maintained since 1945 (Heilemann and Rappen 
2000). In the 1970s, the condition of roads was so poor that many roads could only be 
used to a limited extent; nevertheless, expenditures and investments on roads further 
decreased from 1977 to 1983 (Lorbeer 1990). Enderlein and Kunert (1992) note that even 
the very limited expenditures on maintenance cannot be described as ‘serious measures 
but rather provisional patchwork’. In 1990, the German Council of Economic Experts 
(Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 1990) 
described the road network in the former GDR as ‘extremely poor’ due to insufficient 
maintenance and the use of sub-standard materials. Roads at the local level were in very 
poor condition: the share of district roads70 with ruined surfaces and partly ruined foun-
dations increased from 28% to 41% between 1980 and 1990 (Lorbeer 1990). Studies and 
reports cited in this study indicate that the capital stock of county roads was basically 
depreciated to zero at the time of the German Reunification. In addition, it may be as-
sumed that since that time, any major reconstruction of roads has not been necessary 
because roads usually last for about 30 years (see, for example, Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen 2000, Kommunale Verwaltung Sachsen 2007 and Bayrische Staatskanzlei 
2008).71 This implies that nowadays almost all roads are roughly the same age; therefore, 
the foundations of county roads in eastern German counties are quite similar providing 
an excellent framework for efficiency analysis. 
                                                   
70 In the former GDR, regions were divided into districts rather than counties. Most district roads 
were classified into state roads after the German reunification.  
71 Of course, new county roads have been constructed over the course of time resulting into some 
age differences across eastern German roads. However, these new roads represent a relatively 
small share of the total road network. 
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Fourth, county governments collect data on the quality of their county roads, which 
allows me to include a quality indicator in my empirical analysis. Each county in Ger-
many must assess the value of its assets prior to the public disclosure of their local 
budget.72 These assets include county roads. The value of the roads depends on their 
condition, which can be determined using a standardized scheme that considers cracks, 
patches, general unevenness, road safety and the necessity for future maintenance. These 
defects are recorded and used to construct an index indicating the condition of the total 
road network, which usually uses a range from 1 (very good condition) to 4 (poor con-
dition).73 An example of such a classification scheme is presented in Table 17. The index 
is very similar to the one applied by Rouse et al. (1997), which also included recorded 
defects in the road network. 
  
                                                   
72 The assessment of the asset value is only necessary for the double-entry accounting system. In 
2012, the local governments in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony and Thu-
ringia applied this system. Saxony-Anhalt did not finish the transition to this system; therefore, 
it cannot be included in my empirical analysis. 
73 A few counties use a classification scheme from 1 to 5. In these cases, I adjusted this scheme to 
a 1 to 4 scale with the help of detailed information provided by the respective Bauamt (public 
construction authority) on the condition to which the respective grade is applied. In most cases, 
a classification scheme from 1 to 5 included a differentiation between roads in very good condition 
(grade 2) and new roads (grade 1), which I summarized to one classification (very good condition). 
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TABLE 17. STANDARDIZED SCHEME TO CLASSIFY THE CONDITION OF COUNTY ROADS IN 
GERMAN COUNTIES 
Grade Description 
1.0-1.4 Very good condition 
The structural stability, safety and sustainability of the road are apparent. Ongoing maintenance is nec-
essary. 
1.5-1.9 Good condition 
The structural stability and safety of the road are apparent. The sustainability of the road might be 
slightly affected in the long run. Ongoing maintenance is necessary.  
2.0-2.4 Satisfactory condition (bumps, small amount of damage to the pavement, and bitumen are visible) 
The structural stability and safety of the road are apparent. The sustainability of the road might be af-
fected in the long run. It is possible that in the long run, the damage or consequential damage may 
spread to significantly affect the structural stability and safety or may lead to an increase in deteriora-
tion. Ongoing maintenance is necessary. Restoration will be necessary in the medium run. 
2.5-2.9 Still sufficient condition (cracks, pot holes, and patches are visible) 
The structural stability of the road is apparent. Safety might be compromised. The sustainability of the 
road might be considerably compromised. In the medium run, it is expected that the damage or conse-
quential damage may spread to significantly affect the structural stability and safety of the road or may 
lead to an increase in deterioration. Ongoing maintenance is necessary. Restoration will be necessary in 
the medium run. Measures to address damage or warning signs to maintain road safety might be neces-
sary in the short run. 
3.0-3.4 Critical condition (cracks, large potholes, patches, portions of old pavement, and bumps are visible) 
The structural stability and/or the road safety of the road are affected. The sustainability of the road is 
under some circumstances not met anymore. In the short run, the damage or consequential damage may 
spread to significantly affect the structural stability and safety of the road or may lead to an increase in 
deterioration. Ongoing maintenance is necessary. Immediate restoration is necessary. It may be neces-
sary to immediately address road safety or institute usage restrictions. 
3.5-4.0 Insufficient condition 
The structural stability and/or the safety of the road are compromised. In certain aspects, the sustaina-
bility of the road has been compromised. In the short run, the damage or consequential damage may 
spread to significantly affect the structural stability and safety of the road or may lead to irreparable 
road damage. Ongoing maintenance is necessary. Immediate restoration or renewal is necessary. It is 
necessary to immediately address road safety or institute usage restrictions. 
Notes: The table shows the standardized scheme for which the condition of county roads in German counties should be 
classified. The standards comply with DIN 1076 (for building surveys). Some public construction authorities (Bauämter) 
utilized specialized vehicles to monitor the condition of roads automatically, while others visited their roads in person. 
Source: Own translation based on DIN 1076 and information provided by public construction authorities (Bauämter) in 
eastern German counties (2015). 
4. Estimating differences in the provision of roads 
In the following section, I assess differences in the provision of county roads in eastern 
German counties. First, I discuss the method used in this analysis. Then, I present my 
dataset and perform my analysis. 
4.1 Method 
Technical efficiency refers to the use of economic resources in the most technologically 
efficient manner to produce a certain amount of output (Woodbury and Dollery 2004).74 
                                                   
74 Technical efficiency, in this context, can be interpreted as managerial efficiency, which refers 
to the efficient use of economic resources that are directly overseen by management (Deller and 
Halstead 1994). 
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The empirical measurement of technical efficiency involves the estimation of a produc-
tion frontier: for a given technology, it indicates either the maximum possible output 
for a given input or the minimal input needed to produce a given output. A decision-
making unit (such as a local government) is considered to be efficient when it reaches a 
point on this production frontier. The relative efficiency of governments below this 
frontier can be identified by measuring the deviation from the frontier. The production 
frontier is unknown; therefore, it must be estimated.  
Two main methods have been employed in the literature on efficiency analyses to esti-
mate the production function: the non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) (see 
Farrell 1957, Charnes et al. 1979 and Banker et al. 1984) and the parametric stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) (see Aigner et al. 1977, Meeussen and van den Broeck 1977 and 
Battese and Corra 1977). Parametric approaches assume that the production frontier has 
a certain functional form, usually a Cobb-Douglas or a translog production function, 
and estimate the function with the given observations. Non-parametric approaches de-
fine the efficiency frontier with the help of linear optimization and estimate the produc-
tion frontier by identifying a set of linear estimates that bind (or envelop) the observed 
data (Woodbury and Dollery 2004). Therefore, the production frontier consists of the 
most relatively efficient units in the sample. Then, each observation is compared with 
the piecewise linear surface of the most efficient observations derived (with optimal val-
ues of inputs and outputs), and an efficiency score is generated for each county. If the 
efficiency score of a county is below 1, it is considered to be technical inefficient, i.e., 
there is another (real or fictional) county that is able to provide more services with the 
same amount of inputs or vice versa. The best performing (efficient) counties receive an 
efficiency score of 1.  
To determine whether the parametric or non-parametric approach should be used, un-
fortunately, there is no diagnostic test associated with regression estimation that can be 
applied (Webster et al. 2000). The non-parametric DEA can be used when realistic price 
data are not available for the inputs and outputs (Webster et al. 2000). Another advantage 
of DEA is that it is better suited for small samples, such as that used in this study (Maudos 
et al. 2002). In addition, DEA does not require the functional form of the production 
function or the distributional form of the error term to be specified (Gupta et al. 2012). 
Since the form of the production function is not obvious when considering public units, 
I use a non-parametric approach.  
DEA requires some fundamental decisions regarding the properties of the points in the 
production set. First, the efficiency frontier can be calculated by considering either an 
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input orientation or an output orientation. When using the input orientation, the pro-
duction frontier represents the points at which the lowest level of input is used to pro-
duce a given level of outputs. In contrast, when using the output orientation, the pro-
duction frontier represents the points at which the highest level of output is achieved 
with a given level of inputs. Both approaches yield the same frontier but the calculation 
of the derived efficiency scores is different (Coelli 1996). Previous studies on the effi-
ciency of road provision use input-oriented models (see Table 25 in the appendix). This 
seems appropriate since a decrease in the input factors employed in the process (given a 
constant output) is always feasible, whereas an increase in the output may not be possible 
(for instance, all roads are in excellent condition and an extension of the existing road 
network is not required). In addition, local governments usually seek to optimize their 
budgets, hence, providing an obligatory task at minimum cost. This is possible as Ger-
man counties possess considerable autonomy in their expenditure decisions (see Sec-
tion 3). Thus – and in alignment with previous literature – the input orientation seems 
to be the most appropriate for this analysis. 
Second, the economies of scale in the production process must be identified. DEA was 
initially designed for a constant returns-to-scale-production process (Charnes et al. 1978). 
Banker et al. (1984) refined this method so it can be used for processes with variable 
returns-to-scale. It is not entirely obvious whether constant returns-to-scale are applica-
ble to the production of roads. Studies have measured the economies of scale for public 
road expenditures (see Table 27 in the appendix) and found constant, increasing and de-
creasing returns-to-scale. Therefore, – and again in alignment with previous studies (see 
Table 25 in the appendix) – I use the method developed by Banker et al. (1984) that 
considers variable returns-to-scale. 
4.2 Dataset and results 
Following Kalb (2014), the input necessary to construct and maintain county roads is 
approximated by the total expenditures for county roads.75 I develop the input indicator 
by calculating the average of total expenditures on county roads from 2011 to 2013 for 
                                                   
75 As roads are public goods (i.e., indivisible and non-excludable), there is no need to relate ex-
penditures to the population in each county.  
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each county.76 Table 18 shows that in my sample, there are substantial variations in the 
expenditures for county roads. I exclude urban counties from the analysis because these 
counties are not comparable to rural counties, as there are great differences in terms of 
their functions and expenditures (see Section 3). Outliers have been removed and gener-
ally, each state is equally represented in the sample.77 The data covers only counties in 
Eastern Germany to allow for a comparison of counties for which the foundations of 
the road networks are roughly the same age. This study excludes counties from Saxony-
Anhalt (due to reasons highlighted in Section 3). In summary, the empirical analysis is 
based on data from 2012 (the most recent year for which data is available for all my 
variables) and includes 47, 40 and 23 observations depending on the output variable used. 
TABLE 18. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INPUTS AND OUTPUTS 
Variable Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Input       
Expenditures on county roadsa 2011-2013 47 6,353,496 5,333,281 425,763 21,770,330 
Output       
Area of county road networkb 2012 47 1,743,684 1,236,875 301,600 5,241,600 
Number of accidentsc 2012 40 24.01 15.32 1 59 
Condition of county roadsd 2012 23 2.86 0.57 1.52 3.84 
Notes: The table describes the data set. Urban counties are excluded. a) The mean of construction and maintenance ex-
penditures on county roads in € from 2011 to 2013. b) The area of the county road network in square meters; when data 
were available only on the length of the county roads, the calculation used the average width of county roads, which is 
5.2 m. c) The number of accidents due to poor road conditions. d) The condition of the county roads is classified by a 
grading system from 1 to 4, where 1 constitutes the best condition; the data have been inverted to match the setting of the 
efficiency analysis (the higher the variables, the higher the efficiency). Data: Statistische Landesämter (state statistical 
offices) in Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Thuringia (2017), IÖR (2017), and Bauämter (pub-
lic construction authorities) in eastern German counties (2015). 
                                                   
76 A focus on only operational expenditures would have been desirable as high investment costs 
in one year could skew my results. However, expenditures on roads can be considered as either 
investment costs or operational costs, and there is no definite rule regarding the classification of 
these costs. Therefore, to compare the expenditures of the counties, I included expenditures from 
capital budgets as well as administrative budgets. I try to overcome this problem by calculating 
average expenditures over three years and excluding outliers. As a robustness exercise, I calculate 
the estimated capital stock of county roads, and perform my analysis using these data (see Sec-
tion 6). 
77 For more descriptive statistics and more information on the differences among the subsamples 
used in each model and the eliminated outliers, see Table 28 and Figure 16 in the appendix.  
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The main challenge for my analysis is determining how to measure output. In alignment 
with the second generation of efficiency analyses of road provision, I separate my out-
puts into quantity and quality measures.78 For this study, the quantity output is meas-
ured by the area of the county road network in each county. Thus, I capture both road 
length and road width. The data on the area of the county road network is provided by 
the statistical offices in each state. In cases where only the length of the county road 
network was available, the area of the road network is calculated using the average road 
width, which is used by the IÖR (2017) (i.e., 5.2 m for a two lane road that is not a 
highway). Regarding the quality output, unfortunately, data on the quality of public 
goods and services are scarce.79 Kalb (2014) uses the number of accidents on county roads 
due to poor road conditions to describe the quality of roads but he admits that this proxy 
might be problematic. I obtained actual data on road conditions from some of the local 
public construction authorities of the counties in my sample to overcome this problem. 
I describe how these data are captured in Section 3. When correlating these data with 
data on the number of accidents on county roads due to poor road conditions, the rela-
tionship between the condition of county roads and the number of accidents is positive 
but to a much weaker extent (and statistically not significant) than expected by Kalb 
(2014) (see Table 19 and Figure 20 in the appendix). 
TABLE 19. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE CONDITION OF COUNTY ROADS AND 
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS AT THE COUNTY LEVEL, 2012 
 
 
Number of accidents due 
to poor road conditions 
Accidents due to poor road con-
ditions to all accidents 
Accidents due to poor road 
condition to total population 
Condition of county roadsa 0.0475 0.006 0.141 
Notes: The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for the condition of county roads and the number of accidents 
due to poor road conditions (as used in Kalb 2014) and the correlation between the condition of county roads and the 
number of accidents due to poor road condition on all accidents for the year 2012. Due to data constraints, the sample 
includes only observations in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia. The p-values of all correlation coefficients are higher 
than the 10% significance level; therefore, I cannot conclude that the correlation is different from 0. a) The condition of 
county roads is classified by a grading system from 1 to 4 where 1 constitutes the best condition. Data: Statistische 
Landesämter (state statistical offices) in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia (2017), and Bauämter (public construction 
authorities) in eastern German counties (2015). 
To increase the reliability of the efficiency frontier, I test for different combinations of 
inputs and outputs and multiply the outputs with each other to use as few input and 
                                                   
78 Rouse et al. (1997) argue that a low correlation between quantity and quality outputs highlights 
the necessity to include both measures in the evaluation of efficiency of road provision. I show 
the correlations between the quantity and quality outputs in Table 29 in the appendix. 
79 Even Rouse et al. (1997) who had access to data on the quality of roads needed to adjust their 
output variable as data has not been available for unsealed roads. 
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output variables as necessary, as recommended by Illy (2015).80 Additionally, I compare 
my results with those reported by Kalb (2014), who uses similar data.81 Table 20 shows 
my specifications (i.e., models) as well as the respective results for the input orientation 
with variable returns-to-scale. 
 TABLE 20. RESULTS OF THE EFFICIENCY ANALYSES 
Model Obs. Min. Median Std. Dev. Efficient % efficient 
A: Output area 47 0.116 0.359 0.239 3 6% 
B: Output area and accidentsa 40 0.147 0.519 0.286 8 20% 
C: Output area*accidentsb 40 0.089 0.301 0.268 3 8% 
D: Output area and condition 23 0.135 0.498 0.269 4 17% 
E: Output area*conditionc 23 0.128 0.456 0.263 3 13% 
Results by Kalb (2014): Output area and accidentsd 660 0.05 0.64 0.24 121 18% 
Notes: The table shows the results of the efficiency analysis (DEA) with input orientation and variable returns-to-scale 
using different outputs and only counties with a similar foundation of their road structure. a) The number of accidents 
due to poor road conditions. b) Only one output is used, namely, the product of the output area and the number of 
accidents. c) Only one output is used, namely, the product of the output area and the road condition. d) The results 
reported by Kalb (2014), who applied DEA with input orientation and variable returns-to-scale for the state of Baden-
Wurttemberg. 
As presented in Table 20, the minimum efficiency level (column ‘Min.’) is very low but 
greater than those reported by Kalb (2014). As shown in the fourth column, the median 
efficiency for the different specifications ranges from 30% to 52%, which means that in 
the median county, the same level of output could be achieved using 48% to 70% fewer 
inputs. Compared to the results of previous studies on the efficiency of road provision, 
the results of this study imply eastern German counties to have considerable more effi-
ciency reserves (see Table 25 in the appendix). When more than one output variable is 
included in the model, the efficiency scores improve, and more counties in the sample 
attain the efficiency frontier (which refers to the ‘curse of dimensions’ identified by Illy 
2015). The percentage of efficient counties in models A, C and E (only one output vari-
able) lies between 6% and 13%, while models B and D respectively indicate that 17% and 
20% of the counties are fully efficient. Variations in efficiency scores (column ‘Std. Dev.’) 
slightly increase when a quality output is included, as shown by an increase in the stand-
                                                   
80 The more inputs and outputs are used, the higher the number of dimensions enabling a com-
parison of decision-making units. As a result, the number of suitable reference points decreases, 
leading to more efficient units. Formally the increasing number of dimensions leads to slower 
convergence rates. Therefore, this phenomenon is known as the ‘curse of dimensions’. 
81 The only differences between data used for this study and Kalb’s (2014) study are the observed 
regions (counties in Eastern Germany vs. Baden-Württemberg) and the time frame (2012 vs. 1990-
2004). 
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ard deviation, which ranges from 23.9% to 28.6%. Considering the range of output prox-
ies and the differences in sample sizes, the difference between the minimum and median 
efficiency levels and the variations in the efficiency scores seem to be small across models 
and similar to those reported by Kalb (2014). However, Table 20 does not show the 
differences in efficiency rankings. It is possible that the efficient counties are not the 
same in all the models. Therefore, I use Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to meas-
ure the correlation among the efficiency ranks for the different specifications (see Table 
21).82 
TABLE 21. CORRELATIONS OF THE EFFICIENCY RESULTS USING DIFFERENT OUTPUTS 
 
 
Model B C D E 
B: Output area and accidents 1.00    
C: Output area*accidents 0.84 1.00   
D: Output area and condition 0.64 0.44 1.00  
E: Output area*condition 0.32 0.06 0.93 1.00 
Notes: The table shows the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of the efficiency ranks for the different specifications. 
The efficiency scores were recalculated for the respective sample sizes. 
Models D and E have almost identical rankings; these models have a correlation of 0.93. 
The efficiency ranks between the model with the number of accidents (B and C) and the 
model with the road condition as an output variable (D and E) are not very similar. 
Counties that were identified as more efficient in the model using the number of acci-
dents as the quality variable appear to be less efficient in the model using the road con-
dition as the quality variable. The results indicate that the use of the number of accidents 
as a proxy variable for road quality might be problematic. It is therefore desirable to use 
indices that measure true road quality. 
I conclude, for an efficiency analysis it is crucial to use accurate data because the results 
are very sensitive and depend on the dataset that is used. Therefore, it is important to, 
first, not rely on vague input and output variables but rather develop a suitable proxy 
for local government services (see Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 2017a). Second, this 
should hold true for the selection of the sample data in general; therefore, the study 
should consider other peculiarities of the government service under study (such as the 
age of the road foundation). 
                                                   
82 I use Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to measure the differences among the rankings of 
the efficiency scores because the differences within each rank do not matter.  
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5. Correlation with county characteristics 
The efficiency analysis does not clearly identify the source of inefficiencies. Therefore, 
many studies that conduct efficiency analyses are also concerned with the determinants 
of local governments’ performance (see Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 2017b). Local gov-
ernments face different conditions that are beyond the control of political decision mak-
ers but yet affect the efficiency scores. Such conditions may be socio-economic (such as 
the population density or composition) or geographical (such as the climate). To exam-
ine the nexus between these conditions and the efficiency of road provision, a second-
stage analysis is often conducted (see Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 2017b).83 However, 
this type of analysis cannot be applied here because of the small sample size. To highlight 
the importance of data accuracy, I analyze the correlations between the efficiency scores 
and population density, which, in the German literature, has been considered to have 
relevant influence on the efficient provision of roads (see Suter et al. 2000, Seitz 2002, 
Kalb 2014 and Deilmann et al. 2016).84 
I calculate the correlation of the efficiency scores of models B and D with the population 
density in the respective county (see Table 22).85 
                                                   
83 DEA can be extended into a two-stage approach in which, first, the frontier is derived without 
considering exogenous effects (as in Section 4) and second, a regression model for the efficiency 
is formulated (i.e., the calculated efficiency scores are explained by indicators of potential deter-
minants through regression analysis). These methods are subject to some criticism: first, the re-
sults crucially depend on the efficiency scores that are determined in the first stage. Second, the 
two-stage approach assumes that the determinant variables do not influence the input or output 
levels but only the efficiency of the decision-making unit (Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 2017b). 
Many scholars interpret their results in a causal way, which neglects these endogeneity issues. 
Third, some variables are often omitted due to data limitations or methodological reasons. There-
fore, the derivation of policy implications may not be applicable (Narbón-Perpiñá and de Witte 
2017b). 
84 Seitz (2002) emphasizes the importance of population density when analyzing public expendi-
tures for roads. He finds that as population density decreases, per capita expenditures on county 
road provision and maintenance increase. Suter et al. (2000) find only very moderate additional 
costs in road provision for areas with lower population density in Switzerland. Kalb (2014) con-
ducts an efficiency analysis and considers (among other variables) the population density of the 
counties in his sample. He finds mixed results regarding the relationship between efficiency and 
population density depending on the specification used. Deilmann et al. (2016) also evaluate the 
relationship between population density and efficiency scores and find that German municipali-
ties with a moderate population density tend to be the most efficient. 
85 For a graphical illustration of the differences among the models, see Figure 19 in the appendix. 
 Efficiency of County Road Provision 
 
96 
 
TABLE 22. CORRELATION BETWEEN EFFICIENCY SCORES AND POPULATION DENSITY 
Model Population density 
B: Output area and accidents 0.28* 
D: Output area and condition -0.55*** 
Notes: The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the efficiency scores of different specifications and 
population density (inhabitants per square meter) as of 31/12/2012. Significance levels: *** 0.01, * 0.10. Data: Statistische 
Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017) and Statistische Landesämter (state statistical offices) in Saxony, Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Thuringia (2017). 
When using the area of the road network and the number of accidents as output variables 
(model B), I find that a positive relationship exists between the efficiency scores and 
population density; i.e., more densely populated counties appear to be more efficient. 
However, when using the condition of county roads as an output variable (model D), I 
find quite the opposite relationship. While these findings do not allow me to explore the 
actual sources of inefficiency, they highlight, once again, the need to choose a specific 
and suitable proxy variable for local government services’ output when conducting effi-
ciency analysis. 
6. Robustness exercise 
In my estimation technique, I worked diligently to replicate the approaches undertaken 
in previous studies. However, as investments in roads follow a rather cyclical pattern, 
the usage of total expenditures (both operational expenditures and investments) on 
county roads is subject to some criticism: if a county invested heavily in one year, e.g., 
due to the construction of a new road, it receives a lower efficiency score than a county 
with the same outputs that did not build a new road. However, it is not always clear 
whether expenditures on roads are accounted for as investments or operational costs. 
Therefore, I needed to include expenditures from the capital budget as well as the ad-
ministrative budget to compare expenditures between counties. I account for large dif-
ferences in investments in my baseline analysis in Section 4 by including the average of 
total expenditures from 2011 to 2013. An alternative method is to calculate the sum of all 
previous (discounted) expenditures.86 I estimate the discounted sum of expenditures for 
each county since the German reunification and compare the results to those when using 
the average of expenditures between 2011 and 2013. 
Data on the expenditures on county roads are only available since 1995 for most counties 
included in my sample, and there is no information on investments before 1995. Thus, I 
                                                   
86 By doing so, I estimate a fictitious ‘capital stock’ of county roads. 
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first assume that the ‘capital stock’ of roads before the German reunification is zero 
because the roads in Eastern Germany were entirely depreciated in 1990 (see Section 3). 
Second, I assume that the majority of investments occurred after 1995; therefore, the 
investments that occurred between the German reunification and 1995 can be neglected. 
In 1995, the Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung (Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning) observed that the majority of the county roads in Eastern Ger-
many were in relatively poor condition. Between 1991 and 1998, the majority of invest-
ments focused on highways and bypasses to provide connections across the former inner-
German border (Eckey and Horn 2000 and Komar 2000). However, by the end of the 
1990s, there were still very few connections between rural areas and agglomeration cen-
ters (Komar 2000). As a result, in 1998, the road network was in need of considerable 
investments (Snelting et al. 1998). Furthermore, for one state included in my sample 
(Saxony), data on expenditures on county roads are available from 1992 to the present. 
The data show that investments increased steadily with a considerable wave of invest-
ments in 1995 (see Figure 14).  
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FIGURE 14. DEVELOPMENT OF EXPENDITURES ON COUNTY ROADS IN SAXON COUNTIES 
FROM 1992 TO 2000 
 
Notes: The figure shows the development of the expenditures on county roads in counties in the Free State of Saxony 
(excluding urban counties) from 1992 to 2000 in real prices of 2012 using the price indices of the construction industry 
for underground construction (excluding value added taxes) for Germany. Data: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017) and Statis-
tisches Landesamt (state statistical office) in Saxony (2017). 
I assume that county roads have an average service life of 30 years (see, for example, 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2000, Kommunale Verwaltung Sachsen 2007, and Bay-
erische Staatskanzlei 2008). To calculate the capital stock, I follow the same mathemati-
cal model as the official national accounts in Germany (see Schmalwasser and Schid-
lowski 2006), which derives the consumption of fixed capital from gross capital and the 
service life of the fixed asset. The German national accounts use the density function of 
the gamma distribution to calculate the depreciation, which provides the best approxi-
mation of the depreciation of assets, distributed around the average service life. Capital 
stock 𝐾𝑡 is the sum of the non-depreciated investments of all prior periods 𝜏 < 𝑡 given 
by 
𝐾𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝜏 ∗ (1 − 𝐹(𝜏))
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where 𝐼𝜏 is the investment in year 𝜏. Because roads have an average service life of 30 
years, I define the depreciation function for county roads, 𝐹(𝜏), by 
𝐹(𝜏) = 99(8!)−130−9𝜏8𝑒(−
9𝜏
30
).87 
Table 23 summarizes the results of my calculation of the capital stock of county roads 
in 2012. 
TABLE 23. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INPUT 
 
 
Variable Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Input       
Capital stock of county roads in Mill. €d 2012 40 87.54 68.29 7.41 278.93 
Notes: The table shows the alternative input variable, namely, the capital stock of county roads. Data on counties in 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania were not available before 2008; therefore, those counties were excluded. Data: Statis-
tische Landesämter (state statistical offices) in Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Thuringia 
(2017). 
Next, instead of using the total expenditures on county roads as the input variable, I use 
the capital stock of county roads to calculate the efficiency scores. Table 24 presents the 
results along with a comparison of the results when using total expenditures. 
TABLE 24. RESULTS OF THE EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS USING AN ALTERNATIVE INPUT 
 
Model Obs. Min. Median Std. Dev. Efficient % efficient 
Correlation with three-
year average resultsb 
I: Output area 40 0.112 0.413 0.265 4 10% 0.76 
J: Output area and accidentsa 40 0.112 0.464 0.285 9 23% 0.82 
K: Output area and condition 21 0.112 0.562 0.270 4 20% 0.78 
Notes: The table shows the results of the efficiency analysis (DEA) with input orientation and variable returns-to-scale 
using the estimated capital stock of county roads as the input variable and different outputs. a) The number of accidents 
due to poor road conditions. b) Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
Again, the overall results do not differ much from my baseline analysis. The minimum 
efficiency scores are very similar to the respective models using the three-year average 
(2011-2013) of expenditures as the input variable. The median efficiency scores, which are 
between 0.41 and 0.56, still suggest large efficiency reserves. The share of efficient coun-
ties is somewhat higher when using the discounted sum of expenditures. The reported 
                                                   
87 This function assumes a lower depreciation rate during the early years than a linear depreciation 
rate would. For more details on the depreciation function, see Schmalwasser and Schidlowski 
(2006). 
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Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients show a relatively high correlation with the re-
sults using the three-year average of total expenditures indicating that the counties that 
were identified as more efficient in the model using the alternative input variable are 
about the same as in my baseline model. To summarize, the results in this section suggest 
that my approach (which aligns with previous studies) is fairly robust when using an 
alternative input variable. 
7. Conclusion 
I show that the definition of an appropriate set of input and output variables plays an 
integral role in an efficiency analysis, particularly when evaluating sector-specific effi-
ciency and the data are not widely available. First, I suggest considering the differences 
in the condition of foundations of roads, which has not been done by previous studies. 
Second, I apply a unique variable to measure the quality of county roads, namely, road 
condition, which differs from other quality variables. Overall, I find considerable varia-
tions across counties in the efficiency scores for the provision of county roads and large 
efficiency reserves in eastern German counties. I observe very different results when ap-
plying quality outputs that were used in other studies. The differences in efficiency rank-
ings are substantial and highlight the sensitivity of the data to the definitions of the input 
and output variables. When analyzing the correlations between efficiency scores and 
county characteristics, such as population density, I find opposite relationships (positive 
vs. negative) depending on the quality variable used.  
My findings indicate that there are substantial efficiency differences and efficiency re-
serves in the provision of roads in eastern German counties. In the era of continuing 
urban concentration, an efficiently provided road network could take some pressure off 
urban housing markets. The investigation of factors influencing differences in efficiency 
is subject to future research. 
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10. Appendix 
TABLE 25. OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIFICATIONS APPLIED AND RESULTS OBTAINED BY PREVIOUS 
STUDIES ON THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC ROAD PROVISION 
Study Country 
Govern-
ment layer 
Inputs Outputs 
Gener-
ationa 
Returns-to-
scaleb 
Input/output 
orientationb 
Efficiency 
reservesc 
Deller and Nel-
son (1991) 
United 
States 
Municipal-
ity 
Expenditures 
on roads 
Road length 1st Variable Input 65% 
Deller and 
Halstead (1994) 
United 
States 
Municipal-
ity 
Expenditures 
on roads 
Road length 1s  Variable Input 41% 
Rouse et al. 
(1997) 
New Zea-
land 
County Expenditures 
on roads 
Road length, 
quality index 
2nd Variable/con-
stant 
Input 32% 
Kalb (2014) Germany County Expenditures 
on roads 
Road area, 
accidents 
2nd Variable Input 36% 
Notes: The table presents a summary of the previous literature on the efficiency of public road provision and includes the 
methods applied and results obtained. a) The generation of the study according to the classification outlined in Section 2. 
b) The method employed to estimate the production function in each study was data envelopment analysis. c) The effi-
ciency reserves identified by the studies for the median decision-making unit (same output level could be achieved using 
x% fewer inputs; see also Section 4.2. Source: Own representation. 
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TABLE 26. ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND MAINTENANCE SPENDING IN MILL. € 
(AND SHARE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES) IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1995 TO 
2015 
 Year 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Austria 989 1.0% 983 0.9% 1,130 0.9% 949 0.6% 1,147 0.7% 
Belgium 218 0.2% 208 0.2% 236 0.1% 532 0.3% 1,235 0.6% 
Estonia 31 2.7% 36 1.6% 127 3.3% 175 2.9% 224 2.7% 
Finland 1,056 1.8% 1,022 1.6% 1,195 1.5% 1,557 1.5% 1,743 1.5% 
France 10,983 1.7% 11,168 1.5% 14,060 1.5% 14,574 1.3% 10,877 0.9% 
Germanya 10,216 1.0% 11,967 1.3% 10,200 1.0% 11,240 0.9% 11,690 0.9% 
Greecea - - 1,402 2.1% 1,080 1.2% 1,394 1.2% - - 
Ireland - - 998 3.0% 1,818 3.2% 1,579 1.4% 694 0.9% 
Italy 9,836 1.9% 16,650 3.0% 21,718 3.1% 9,826 1.2% - - 
Latvia 12 0.8% 37 1.4% 209 4.5% 244 3.0% 374 4.1% 
Luxembourg 137 2.1% 192 2.2% 163 1.2% 216 1.2% 260 1.2% 
Netherlands - - 2,251 1.2% 2,361 1.0% 3,509 1.2% - - 
Portugal 862 2.3% 1,089 2.0% 2,289 3.1% 1,613 1.7% - - 
Slovak Republic 78 0.8% 294 1.8% 460 2.3% 517 1.8% 1,335 3.7% 
Slovenia - - 451 5.2% 549 4.2% 358 2.0% 228 1.2% 
Spaina 4,263 2.1% 4,792 1.9% 8,580 2.4% 7,854 1.6% 4,183 0.9% 
Lithuania 26 1.0% 170 3.2% 290 4.1% 582 4.9% 417 3.2% 
Notes: The table presents the expenditures on road infrastructure and road maintenance in mill. € at the local and national 
level and this amount as a percentage of the total government expenditures in European countries for 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010 and 2015. a) Data were only available on road infrastructure investment. Data: OECD (2017). 
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FIGURE 15. SHARE OF INVESTMENTS IN THE CATEGORY ‘ROADS’ TO TOTAL CONSTRUCTION 
INVESTMENTS IN GERMAN STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES FROM 2004 TO 2015 
 
Notes: The figure shows the development of the share of investments in the category ‘roads’ to total construction invest-
ments in German states (excluding city states from 2004 to 2015). The slight decrease in the share of investments on roads 
might be explained by the overall completion of road infrastructure projects and tighter budgets. Unfortunately, data on 
expenditures at the county level for all of Germany was not available but can be assumed to follow a similar pattern. 
Data: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017b). 
TABLE 27. OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN PUBLIC ROAD 
PROVISION 
Study Country Government Layer Returns-to-scalea 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) United States State + / 0 
Deller and Nelson (1991) United States Municipality + 
Deller and Halstead (1994) United States Municipality + 
Kraus (1981) United Kingdom State + 
McGreer and McMillan (1993) Canada Municipality - 
Pommerehne (1978) Switzerland Municipality - 
Pommerehne and Frey (1976) Switzerland Municipality - 
Santerre (1985) United States Municipality 0 
Notes: The table presents an overview of empirical studies measuring the economies of scale in the provision of public 
roads. a) + indicates that increasing returns-to-scale were identified; 0 indicates that constant returns-to-scale were identi-
fied; and - indicates that decreasing returns-to-scale were identified. Source: Own representation, following Reiter and 
Weichenrieder (2003). 
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TABLE 28. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SUBSAMPLES USED IN EACH MODEL 
Model 
Number 
of obser-
vations 
Mean pop-
ulation 
Mean popu-
lation den-
sityb 
Mean expend-
itures on 
county roadsc 
Mean area of 
road net-
workd 
Mean 
number of 
accidentsa,e 
Mean condi-
tion of county 
roadsf 
A: Output area 47 164,966 105 6,353,496 1,743,684 (24)e (2.9)e 
B: Output area and accidentsa 40 158,557 112 6,323,384 1,499,816 24 (2.8)e 
C: Output area and conditionf 23 178,003 117 7,545,816 2,019,189 (22)e 2.9 
Notes: The table describes the data set. Urban counties are excluded. a) The number of accidents due to poor road condi-
tions. b) The average inhabitants per square kilometer. c) The mean construction and maintenance expenditures on 
county roads in € from 2011 to 2013. d) The area of the county road network in square meters; some data were calculated 
using the average width of county roads (5.2 m) when data were only available on the length of county roads. e) The 
numbers refer only to counties for which data were available, i.e., not to the full sample size. f) The condition of county 
roads is classified by a grading system from 1 to 4 where 1 represents the best condition; the data have been inverted to 
match the setting of efficiency analysis (the higher the variables, the higher the efficiency). Data: Statistische Landesämter 
(state statistical offices) in Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Thuringia (2017), Statistische Äm-
ter des Bundes und der Länder (2017), and Bauämter (public construction authorities) in eastern German counties (2015). 
FIGURE 16. SCATTER PLOTS OF SAMPLE WITH OUTLIERS  
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of counties included in the sample when outliers are included. The left figure 
shows the ratio of the area of the road network (quantity output variable) to the expenditures on county roads (input 
variable) in relationship to the ratio of the condition of the road network (quality output variable) to expenditures. The 
right figure does the same but uses the number of accidents as the quality output variable. Black data points are included 
in my empirical analysis, and gray data points have been eliminated. 
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FIGURE 17. COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY SCORES RELATIVE TO EXPENDITURES WHEN USING 
DIFFERENT QUALITY OUTPUTS 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of counties included in the sample when using either the condition of the road 
network (left hand side) or the number of accidents as one output variable (right hand side). Black data points represent 
counties in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, gray data points represent counties in Saxony, light blue data points repre-
sent counties in Thuringia and dark blue points represent counties in Brandenburg. 
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FIGURE 18. COMPARISON OF THE EFFICIENCY SCORES RELATIVE TO THE AREA OF THE ROAD 
NETWORK WHEN USING DIFFERENT QUALITY OUTPUTS 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of counties included in the sample when using the either the condition of the 
road network (left hand side) or the number of accidents as one output variable (right hand side). Black data points 
represent counties in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, gray data points represent counties in Saxony, light blue data 
points represent counties in Thuringia and dark blue points represent counties in Brandenburg. 
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FIGURE 19. COMPARISON OF THE EFFICIENCY SCORES RELATIVE TO POPULATION DENSITY 
WHEN USING DIFFERENT QUALITY OUTPUTS 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of counties included in the sample when using the either the condition of the 
road network (left hand side) or the number of accidents as one output variable (right hand side). Black data points 
represent counties in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, gray data points represent counties in Saxony, light blue data 
points represent counties in Thuringia and dark blue points represent counties in Brandenburg. 
TABLE 29. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN QUALITY AND QUANTITY OUTPUTS 
 
 Quantity output area Quality output accidents Quality output condition 
Quantity output area 1.00   
Quality output accidents 0.35 1.00  
Quality output condition -0.30 0.05 1.00 
Notes: The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the output variables used. The low correlation be-
tween quantity and quality outputs highlights the need for the inclusion of both in efficiency analyses (see Rouse et al. 
1997). 
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FIGURE 20. SCATTER PLOT FOR DIFFERENT QUALITY VARIABLES 
 
Notes: The figure shows the scatter plot for two quality variables, namely, the condition of the road network and the 
number of accidents due to poor road conditions. 
 
